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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the necessity of psychological strategies to combat the Islamic
State’s recruitment of foreign fighters. This thesis argues that psychological strategies are
a primary weapon due to the psychological nature of the war against the Islamic State,
which is a part of the overall war of ideas. This thesis does not consider psychological
strategies for other aspects of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, nor does it reflect the
difficulties involved with developing U.S. strategies in the U.S. federal government.
Furthermore, this thesis only focuses on foreign fighter defending and supporting the
Islamic State, which is the successor of Al Qaeda in Iraq and does not consider foreign
fighters supporting other terrorist organizations. The result of the research done for this
thesis finds that psychological strategies must become a core element in U.S. policy
towards this issue.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Introduction
“But there is also such a thing as a spirit of the time, an attitude of mind
characteristic of a particular generation, which is passed on from individual to
individual and gives society its particular tone. Each of us has to do his little bit
towards transforming this spirit of the times” ~ Albert Einstein 1

This thesis asserts the role of Information Operations (IO) and its diplomatic
counterpart, strategic communications, as a core instrument to ultimately bring strategic
success against foreign fighters that currently fight for and defend the Islamic State. For
more than fifteen consecutive years, the United States has been actively engaged in the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This ongoing war has resulted in 1.6 trillion dollars
spent, nearly 7,000 American lives lost, and the level of progress made is ambiguous due
to both the fragile state of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the reemergence of Al Qaeda
and the emergence of the Islamic State.2 The U.S.’s primary strategy in the GWOT has
been utilizing conventional forces, such as air, land, and sea operations to disrupt,
degrade, and defeat enemy combatants in multiple theaters.3 During Operation Iraqi

Albert Einstein, The world as I see it New York: Wisdom Library, 1979, 8
Niall McCarthy, “The War On Terror Has Cost Taxpayers $1.7 Trillion”, February 3, 2015. Accessed
December 10, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/02/03/the-war-on-terror-has-costtaxpayers-1-7-trillion-infographic/#12bacc175cf0.
Megan Crigger, Laura Santhanam, ”How Many Americans Have Died in U.S. Wars?”, PBS. May 24,
2015. Accessed December 11, 2016. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/many-americans-died-u-s-wars/
As of the date of this article the total was at 6,852
3
"The National Military Strategy of the United States of America”, June 2015. Accessed December 10,
2016, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf, 5
1
2

1

Freedom, the U.S. focused on air sorties and conventional land forces to disrupt the
targeted regime’s power; and to effectively overthrow Saddam’s regime.4 Operation Iraqi
Freedom was successful in toppling the government, however, this did not stop the
insurgencies that ensued.
Currently, the U.S. is conducting similar strategies against the Islamic State.
These strategies focus on destroying the Islamic State, which has seen a surge of support
from foreign fighters.5 Moreover, terrorist attacks have spread outside this area to
Europe, as well as the U.S. homeland resulting in the deaths of hundreds of citizens in the
U.S. and Europe. As of 2016, the FBI had over 1,000 investigations for Islamic Staterelated threats in all 50 states, and in the past year alone the number of arrests of
“Jihadist” terrorist in the U.S. reached 90 arrests.6 This suggests that the problem is not
improving, but in fact becoming worse.
This thesis attempts to reason that information operations, and its diplomatic
counterpart strategic communications, must be regarded as a core weapon of U.S.
military operations against foreign fighters supporting the Islamic State. This thesis is
divided into five chapters covering important dynamics of the foreign fighter issue.
Chapter one defines information operations and its functions; chapter two focuses on
information operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom and lessons learned; chapter three
covers an analysis on the Islamic State and how it is currently conducting an information

4

Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy, New York:
Encounter Books, 2006., Chapters 5-9 Describe U.S. shift to air dominance as a center of gravity for U.S.
strategy from Desert Storm to today.
5
Lisa Curtis,” Combatting the ISIS Foreign Fighter Pipeline: A Global Approach”, January 6, 2016.
Accessed February 10, 2017. http://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/combatting-the-isis-foreignfighter-pipeline-global-approach.
6
Ibid
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operations campaign against those it deems its enemy; chapter four focuses on the foreign
fighter radicalization process and how the process is largely created through the Islamic
State’s IO, and the final chapter covers recommendations for U.S. policy. Each chapter is
intended to support the thesis statement: information operations must be a principal
weapon in the U.S. strategy to degrade the Islamic State’s recruitment of foreign fighters.
The necessity of information operations stems from globalization and the
advancement of technology.7 As the world is now in the thick of the “information
revolution”, the consequences of using or not using such tools as information operations
must be reevaluated. As described by Bunyamin Turner with the Naval Postgraduate
School:
It is no wonder that the industrial age witnessed the appearance and dominance of,
the warfighting machines such as tanks, planes, aircraft carriers, etc. The armed
forces of that age became successful by making these machines faster, more lethal
and more survivable, and massing them in a coordinated fashion. The industrial
age resulted in the ubiquitous existence of these machines in many nations, and
caused armed forces to search for better ways to employ what they have using the
improvements in technology. We are now the dwellers of the so-called
information age. It is no surprise that the terms like Information Operations (IO),
Information Warfare, and Information Superiority have become popular as force
multipliers.8
Similar to how the airplane and the machine gun revolutionized military strategies and
war, from open field battle to trench warfare and beyond, today’s militaries are faced
with vast quantities of information covering every moment of a conflict. As well, global
civilian populations are equipped with instant coverage from inside conflicts due to major

7

Peter F. Drucker, "Beyond the Information Revolution." The Atlantic. October 01, 1999. Accessed
February 28, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/10/beyond-the-informationrevolution/304658/.
8
Bunyamin Turner, “INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND
TACTICAL LEVELS OF WAR: A BALANCED SYSTEMATIC APPROACH”, September 2003.
Accessed January 10, 2017. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a418305.pdf.
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social media networks. The ability for individuals or groups to spread information about a
conflict without the training or limitations on providing context for that information
allows for manipulation and the subjugation of actors’ perceptions in a conflict.9 This
means that providing the context for the mass coverage is key in the new age war.

What Is It? Information Operations Defined
Information operations can be described best as “an attempt by the United States
to develop a set of doctrinal approaches for its military and diplomatic forces to use and
operationalize the power of information. The target of information operations (IO) is the
adversary decision-maker and therefore the primacy of effort will be to coerce that person
into doing or not doing a certain action.”10 The objective of information operations
targets the hearts and minds of a decision maker, or the population around a decision
maker, in order to create an effect that best suits the U.S agenda. IO focuses on
intelligence collection and cultural understanding in order to efficiently influence the
population or leadership.11 IO requires a spectrum of soft power tactics and techniques,
such as knowing one’s adversary at the innermost level and implementing a strategy that
focuses on the psychology of an adversary.12 Not prioritizing the understanding of and
winning the hearts and minds results in an ideology lingering long after an organization
has been defeated, which may lead to a resurgence.

"Why ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War." Wired. Accessed February 12, 2017.
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/.
10
Dan Kuehl, “Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power”, Accessed December 10, 2016.
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/jiopc/io-textbook.pdf, 11
11
Ibid., 13
12
Ibid., 12
9
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Information operations consists of the execution of many tools, such as:
psychological operations (PSYOPS), electronic warfare (EW), computer network
operations (CNO), military deception (MILDEC), intelligence, military information
support operations (MISO), operational security (OPSEC), public affairs (PA), and the
deployment of special operations forces (SOF) and covert action units. To establish an indepth understanding of how information operations work and why it is such a salient
function of U.S. policy against the foreign fighters supporting the Islamic State, the
functions of IO must be understood individually to appreciate how IO would be a
successful strategy against the Islamic State.
Psychological operations are a vital and core tool for information operations.
Psychological operations are designated as, “planned operations to convey selected
information to targeted foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals.”13 This is done in a variety of ways, for example, broadcast media and
images such as pamphlets. Targeting the emotions and reasoning of an adversary or the
population around or supporting the adversary can lead to the U.S. undermining and
hindering the adversary’s ability to continue a conflict from lack of morale or resources.
As outlined by the Department of Defense, electronic warfare is, “any military
action involving the direction or control of electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or
attack the enemy.”14 This includes electrical and signal jamming, electromagnetic pulses,
and even directed energy attacks. The benefit of electronic warfare is, one can deny a

13

Clay Wilson, “Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar”, March 20, 2007. Accessed
February 10, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31787.pdf. 3
14
Ibid., 6
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target the ability to communicate information electronically or can only allow certain
information to enter the targeted area. Jamming an adversary’s ability to communicate
can create an uncoordinated and ineffective strategy.
Computer Network Operations (CNO) is the cyber warfare aspect of information
operations. CNO includes, “the capability to (1) attack and disrupt enemy computer
networks; (2) defend our own military information systems; and (3) exploit enemy
computer networks through intelligence collection, usually done through use of computer
code and computer applications.”15 CNO handles the cyber aspects of information
operations, which along with electronic warfare, focuses on cyber espionage and
intelligence collection. Details of this weapon are classified, and therefore, CNO will
only be discussed in broad context.
Military deception consists of, “actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary
military decision makers with regard to friendly military capabilities, thereby causing the
adversary to take (or fail to take) specific actions that will contribute to the success of the
friendly military operation.”16 Another way to phrase MILDEC is misinformation and
disinformation. A famous example of MILDEC is June 6, 1944, where allied forces in
advance of the invasion of Normandy, imparted disinformation to the Nazi’s to create the
illusion that the allied forces beach landing would be at France’s Pas de Calais region
instead of Normandy.17 The deception worked and allowed for D-day to be a victory for
the allies. MILDEC applications are useful in contemporary conflicts, such as against the

15

Ibid., 4
Wilson,” Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar “, 4
17
Christopher Klein, “Fooling Hitler: The Elaborate Ruse Behind D-Day”, History.com. June 03, 2014.
Accessed February 10, 2017. http://www.history.com/news/fooling-hitler-the-elaborate-ruse-behind-d-day
16
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Islamic State, by creating confusion as to a U.S. presence or contribution to an operation
or events in a targeted area.
Military information support operations (MISO) are best specified as, “… planned
operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the
originator’s objectives.”18 Best stated by U.S. Special Operations Command Public
Affairs Office, “… the ultimate objective of U.S. MISO is to convince enemy, neutral,
and friendly nations and forces to take action favorable to the United States and its allies.
The ranks of the MISOC include regional experts and linguists who understand political,
cultural, ethnic and religious subtleties and use persuasion to influence perceptions and
encourage desired behavior.”19 MISO ensures that military operations are developed and
provided with context to be better understood by an enemy or the population involved in
a conflict. A form of MISO, known as the human terrain system, will be further discussed
along with its success in chapter two.
Operational security, more commonly known as OPSEC, is a government or
military’s full control of information that is beneficial to an enemy. Defined as, “a
process of identifying information that is critical to friendly operations and which could
enable adversaries to attack operational vulnerabilities.”20 OPSEC breaches range from

18

Joint Publication, “Military Information Support Operations”, December 20, 2011. Accessed February
10, 2017. https://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/Lessons/JP3_13_2_MISO_(20-Dec-2011)-LMS1255.pdf, vii
19
“MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE)
(PROVISIONAL) FACT SHEET”, Accessed February 10, 2017.
http://www.soc.mil/MISOC/MISO%20fact%20sheet.pdf
20
Wilson, “Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar”, 4
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an adversary locating friendly forces to an adversary infiltrating and acquiring tactical,
operational, or strategic level information that hinders U.S. operational performance and
ultimate success. OPSEC is crucial for any clandestine or covert operation that is
conducted. As will be discussed along in the recommendations portion, OPSEC is the
foundation on which U.S. strategy can be successful.
Public affairs is the military’s pairing with strategic communications and public
diplomacy capability. Public affairs deal with the public perception of government and
military activities both domestically and abroad. Public affairs, “comprises public
information, command information, and public engagement activities directed toward
both the internal and external publics with interest in DOD. External publics include
allies, neutrals, adversaries, and potential adversaries.”21 Public affairs are open
dialogues, often press releases and informational documents, that are related to an
information operation or psychological strategy. Public affairs are different from MISO,
in that MISO is mission specific and public affairs are more operationally focused.
Other aspects that will be considered as part of an information operations
capability are the special operations forces that conduct information operations, as well as
covert action units. Both tools of foreign policy handle direct action portions of
information operations and are designed to leave very little if no U.S. footprint in the
targeted area. As stated by Major Gottschalk with the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, “The special forces group is a flexible, multipurpose organization designed
to plan, conduct and support special operations in any operational environment in peace,

21

Joint Publication,” Information Operations”, November 20, 2014. Accessed February 10, 2017.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf, II-7
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conflict or war.”22 This is beneficial for a U.S. information operations policy because of
the clandestine nature of IO, which SOF and covert action are best suited to conduct.
Covert action will be considered as part of special operations due to the emerging shift in
how covert actions are currently being executed. Covert action has been, traditionally,
run by the Central Intelligence Agency. However, after 9/11, decision makers involved
with the planning of covert action argued that SOF plays a greater role.23 This has been
controversial due to lack of congressional oversight that CIA covert action requires.
However, the trend continues that special operations have largely taken over a fair
amount of covert action and therefore, will be considered as a tool for SOF and IO units.
An example of such is the training of foreign militia to overthrow an existing government
or covert action creating an economic crisis to further worsen a conflict. For the purposes
of this paper, SOF and covert action will be mainly propaganda campaigns, economic
covert action, and paramilitary operations to both discredit the Islamic State and change
public perception of them in a way that best suits U.S. interests.
Along with these tools is also the collection of intelligence. Information
operations require the collection of intelligence that may assist in changing public or
government perception and rationale.24 The concept of knowing one’s adversary is
paramount to an effective strategy against it. This includes cultural insight of a target
area, as well as psychological profiles of the individual leaders and sociological and

22

Fredrick Gottschalk, “THE ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS”, 2000.
Accessed February 10, 2017. handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA383815, 25
23
Fredrick Best, Andrew F., “Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for
Congress”, August 3, 2009. Accessed February 10, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22017.pdf, 3
24
Joint Publication. "Information Operations." November 20, 2014. Accessed February 10, 2017.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf.

9

anthropological knowledge.25 As previously stated, chapters three and four are devoted
to an in-depth analysis of the Islamic State and the radicalization process for foreign
fighters and why the Islamic State is so appealing to foreign fighters.
As information operations are regarded as a military aspect, the diplomatic
counterpart must also be considered in this thesis. Strategic communications coordinate
the U.S. message beyond military strategy, to political strategy. Strategic
communications are designated best as, “(a) the synchronization of words and deeds and
how they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well as (b) programs and activities
deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including
those implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations
professionals.”26 Strategic communications have a prominent role in U.S. foreign policy,
from the United State Information Agency to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
However, this prominence has diminished since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Why It Matters: Information Operations And The War On Terror
Information operations would benefit the U.S. conflict against the foreign fighter
problem, as well as the Islamic State, when one considers the ideological nature of the
conflict, as well as the definition of terrorism overall. Terrorism is a word that has been
used widely both before September 11th and exponentially after to mean a variety of
concepts, thus has been diluted with misinterpretations. Therefore, to ensure no

25

Ibid.
The Whitehouse, “NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION”, 2008.
Accessed February 10, 2017. https://fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf, 2
26
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misunderstandings happen regarding the significant impact information operations would
have against the Islamic State and the foreign fighter dilemma, a definition of terrorism
must be provided. A good working definition of terrorism was developed by Christopher
Harmon, Andrew Pratt, and Sebastian Gorka. The definition of terrorism is composed of
four main factors: (1) terrorism is a tool and not an ideology, (2) terrorism is always used
for political reasons, regardless of the propaganda pushed by the organization, (3) this
tool is used to influence a broader audience, both to instill fear, and to gain support, and
finally, (4) where often terrorism is confused with freedom fighters, terrorism targets
innocent civilians directly while freedom fighters do not.27 These factors make up the
terrorism tactic. The definition provided takes a more holistic approach, centered on
terrorism as a tool and not an organization. This is significant because terrorism is often
looked at as a group, and therefore leads to the illusion that destroying the group ensures
victory. However, as Benjamin Kuipers, a professor at the University of Michigan and an
expert in cognitive mapping and spatial knowledge states, “purely military tactics and
strategy will fail against the terrorists, and will even be exploited to their advantage.”28
The meaning of this statement is that conventional methods of war are insufficient
against terrorism because the ideological nature behind the use of the terrorism tool may
survive the destruction of an organization.
Therefore, instead of viewing terrorism as a group, it is more important to
separate the terrorism tool and the ideology behind it. This matters because a tool is used

27

Christopher Harmon, Andrew N. Pratt, and Sebastian Gorka, Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism,
New York: McGraw Hill Companies, 2011, 6
28
Benjamin Kuipers, “How To Defeat Terrorism”, August 5, 2004. Accessed February 10, 2017.
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/kuipers/opinions/defeating-terrorism.html.
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only when there is a desire to use it. By separating the two concepts, it is better
understood that the U.S. is at war not with the terrorism tool, but with the violent
ideology behind the act. Therefore, the war on terrorism is an ideological war. It is in the
hearts and minds of any population susceptible to being radicalized to the point of using
the terrorism tool. Combating an ideology requires weapons focused on changing
perception and psychology.
The understanding of the nature of the war on terror, as well as the functions of
information operations and strategic communications, are essential in realizing a
successful policy against the foreign fighter dilemma, as well as successfully combating
the Islamic State. As well, understanding the situation is equally necessary, as the conflict
regarding the Islamic State and the foreign fighters is not a new conflict, but the
continuation of a previous one. The next chapter will assess lessons learned concerning
information operations conducted throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). By
identifying the positives and negatives of the operation, one can eliminate repeated
mistakes, and promote effective recommendation.

12

CHAPTER TWO: ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS DURING
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

“… purely military defenses, no matter how powerful, can never insure any nation’s
security” ~ Dwight D. Eisenhower 29

Support for the Islamic State by foreign fighters partly stems from a continuation
of certain U.S. entanglement in the Middle East, primarily Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF). The OIF conflict left the region in a profoundly vulnerable situation, such as a frail
Iraqi government and sectarian violence, which allowed for the Islamic State to flourish
and rally support. To the Middle East, the Islamic State is not necessarily separate from
Operation Iraqi Freedom, therefore, the dynamics of OIF should be addressed to fully
understand the current situation. Therefore, an analysis of U.S. strategy regarding
information operations must be made to establish lessons learned and foresee future
possible outcomes.
This chapter aims to demonstrate U.S. information operations and strategic
communications strategies conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as the
consequences of such policies. The focus of this chapter is the military strategy leading
up to the invasion, to the Coalition Provisional Authority, to the Anbar Awakening and
the surge, to finally the withdrawal from Iraq. It will not cover in detail the events after
the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011.

29

Michael Waller, The Public Diplomacy Reader. Washington: Institute of World Politics Press, 2007, 294
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Leading to the Invasion
U.S. strategy in the Iraq was derived from a continuous evolution in the U.S. way
of war throughout the 20th century. Many events that shaped U.S. strategy date back to
before the 1990s during the second offset after the Vietnam War, and the change in U.S.
posture in the post-Cold War era.30 After the Vietnam war, the United States went
through a major revolutionary military affair, or RMA.31 The outcome of this, “second
offset” was the United States refocused towards superior technology, much of that
technology being in airpower.32 The need for the U.S. military to be technologically
superior extended beyond the war in Vietnam towards the Cold War, which strategies
focused on a balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR. This resulted in policies
based on symmetric warfare, which prioritize large conventional forces that matched an
opponent’s might.33 The result was a heavy emphasis on U.S. hardware and winning
decisive battles.
Moving past the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States engaged in
multiple small wars throughout the world during the 1990s. Operations such as Desert
Storm, Gothic Serpent (Mogadishu 1993), and the Balkans wars began to shape U.S.
strategist’s mindset on how to best effectively train and operate the U.S. military. Much
of these U.S. war strategies centered around major air strikes followed by ground forces
being a secondary element to conduct an occupation of territory and to combat broken

30

Kagan, Finding the Target
Ibid., Chapters 1-5 discuss the U.S. weapons and strategy modernization focused on air dominance.
32
Ibid., Chapter 1
33
Kagan, Finding the Target, 78, “He [Reagan] therefore focused on the size and composition of the Navy
in order to allow it compete with the Soviets in multiple theaters…He dramatically expanded the military
reserve components, especially the Army National Guard and Reserves…”
31
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forces who survived the air strikes, apart from perhaps Mogadishu, which did not utilize
air strike campaigns and was not successful in establishing U.S. dominance.34 Because of
the high success that the Balkans wars and Operation Desert Storm, and because
Mogadishu was considered a blunder of an operation by U.S. ground forces, U.S. strategy
prioritized advanced technology and weaponry, primarily regarding superior air power
and precision ordinance over boots on the ground during small scale conflicts, which
Operation Iraqi Freedom was expected to be.35
The strategy developed was also beneficial because of the time it’s
implementation, when the U.S. had a strong desire for less defense spending and a
smaller military.36 During the peace dividend, the United States concentrated on domestic
issues and no longer spent considerable money on a robust national defense. Along with
the fiscal restraints came the notion that the U.S. would be fighting smaller wars as the
operations in the 1990’s seemed to represent, which led to a reduction in intelligence
collection and military spending overall.37 The concept of the U.S. fighting small, short
wars, along with the understanding that having its military strategy oriented around a
strong air campaign, led to U.S. strategist disregarding long-term policies used
throughout the Cold War, such as information operations. This confidence in the new
U.S. air dominance strategy was further shown 1999, when the U.S decided to

34

Ibid Chapters 5-9 discuss this the second offset; a revolutionary military strategy in the 1990s.
Kagan, Finding the Target, 220
36
“Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review”, 2003. Accessed December 10, 2016.
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/qdr/. The report discussed the reduction of national defense spending.
37
Ibid., Section 3
35
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deprioritize strategic communications elements, such as the United States Information
Agency.38
The United States Information Agency (USIA) had been the U.S.’s main source
for propaganda during the Cold War. However, after the Cold War ended, the U.S.
questioned the necessity to continue such operations because of the new small-scale,
rapid warfare. The USIA was then absorbed into the U.S. State Department, where it
remains today.39 The USIA was considered to be a cornerstone during the Cold War
strategy, yet was no longer seen as needed in the post-Cold War era. The shift in focus
and priorities shaped U.S. policy decision making for future warfare and narrowed U.S.
options after September 11th.
The ramifications of these policies and strategies were considered with high
regard and were supported as sound strategies after the events of 9/11 when U.S. forces
deployed to Afghanistan to both hunt Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, as well as overthrow the
Taliban regime controlling the state. U.S. strategy in this was based on the same shock
and awe campaign that had been successful in the Balkans wars, where U.S. forces would
sweep through a country quickly to overthrow the regime.40 The theory of shock and awe
was to overwhelm and disorient the adversary enough to where the U.S. could overthrow
the Taliban regime without large-scale forces on the ground.41 The U.S. was successful in
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overthrowing the Taliban regime in a matter of several weeks with a small level of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan.
The quick success of overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan established
further support from policy makers towards shock and awe as an effective strategy for the
global war on terror and asymmetric warfare. As argued by Frederick Kagan, a former
professor at West Point Military Academy, “Rumsfeld and his team in the Pentagon
largely took away from the war in Afghanistan the conclusion that their transformation
program worked…They thus prepared the war in Iraq based upon many of the
presuppositions they had had before 9/11, oblivious of the fact that these theories had not
really been tested in Afghanistan or anywhere else.”42 However, as time has revealed, the
“shock and awe” method of warfare was not successful on the strategic scale in either
country. The Taliban adapted and resurged in 2005, and the U.S. is still conducting
operations in the region.43
These factors created the environment in which U.S. strategy regarding Iraq
would be forged. Because of the success of the operation in Afghanistan, Central
Command, the combatant command responsible for Iraq war planning, focused on
conventional tactics to create a war strategy that fixated on shock and awe, and the
overthrow of Saddam’s regime as the primary objective for the U.S.44 At the time,
concepts such as information operations did not seem necessary for such a speedy and
42
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decisive conflict. It is no wonder then as to why CENTCOM overlooked information
operations in its war planning.
Consideration for information operations in the Iraq strategy was best seen in
CENTCOM’s “Phase IV” planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which was the
transitioning of the new Iraqi government.45 The underlying assumptions behind this
transition were that the Iraqi people wanted to be liberated from Saddam, and would
accept democracy wholeheartedly.46 The U.S confidence in this assumption was such,
that U.S. war planning deemed that only 150,000 troops, or the equivalent of the number
of police in California, would be needed in the invasion. As Kagan states, the low number
of troops was suggested because “No serious thought was given to the contingency that
Iraq might not behave like California.”47 The expectation was that the Iraqi people would
take advantage of the opportunity for democracy without resistance. What was
overlooked perhaps, was the intense sectarian issues that lay dormant beneath Saddam’s
oppression waiting for an opportunity to surface.48 The sectarian tensions were not
considered because the war planning did not require methods and technical aspects that
would allow for this information to be a focal point. Aspects such as solid intelligence
collection and analysis as well as cultural awareness were discarded for what could be
considered mirror imaging, or one perceiving and processing information through the
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filter of personal experience.49 Mirror imaging can lead to misunderstandings and false
assumptions about intelligence collected or the goals of actors.
The U.S. strategy leading to the invasion of Iraq overlooked many aspects that a
policy encompassing information operations may have foreseen and mitigated. First, the
lack of intelligence collected led to assumptions about the capabilities of the Iraqi
military. Over a decade of sanctions against Iraq had left the country deprived of many
assets and necessities to make war.50 Furthermore, the Iraqi population had also been
suffering the effects of the West with their own line of sanctions. The sanctions, along
with the embarrassment of Desert Storm had created resentment towards the West.51
This, along with the understanding of the effectiveness the U.S. had against the Iraqi
army in 1991, would lead to the understanding that shock and awe may have been
overzealous.
In addition to the misunderstandings of the situation of Iraq at the time leading to
the invasion, was also much miscommunication of U.S. strategy domestically from 2002
to 2005. News coverage and media can influence a population the same as any strategic
communications strategy or information operation. As public perception is the driving
force behind democracy, influence factors on the U.S. population determine success and
failures in much of the U.S. agenda. September 11th forced the Bush administration to set
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aside its initial agenda to manage the aftermath of the attack.52 Any combat operation
planned before 9/11 was viewed as inconsequential as suddenly the United States was
faced with the gravity of the new world that emerged on September 12th. The Bush
administration was forced to shift concentration on the new mission of defeating the
Taliban quickly, by having deployed forces in Afghanistan in less than one month.53
However, the quick and decisive victory over the Taliban allowed the Bush
administration to refocus resources to Iraq. However, deciding to invade Iraq in the wake
of both the 9/11 attack and overthrowing the Taliban government in Afghanistan
confounded many as to whether the invasion into Iraq was part of the overall Global War
on Terror.
This confusion was further amplified when White House officials, to include both
President Bush and Vice President Cheney, stated the reasoning behind the Iraq invasion
was a strong relationship between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. Best explained in an
article by Glenn Kessler in the Washington Post, “In former CIA director George Tenet’s
memoir, In the Center of the Storm… the CIA’s battles with Cheney’s office over the
intelligence concerning connections between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Before the invasion of
Iraq, the CIA also tangled with the Pentagon operation that provided its own (disputed by
the CIA) assessment of the available intelligence… the agency even has to fend off White
House interference to publish a paper by top analysts showing three areas of concern
regarding Iraq and al-Qaeda- safe haven, contacts and training-but in which ‘they could
not translate this data into a relationship where the two entities had ever moved beyond
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to seeking ways to take advantage of each other” (emphasis added by author).54 The
uncertainty about the reason for the invasion of Iraq would lead to many Americans
unsupportive for the war as it progressed. Transparency as to the reason for the war in
Iraq from the U.S. policy was crucial to rallying support from both the U.S. domestic
population as well as the international community. The misperception from vague or
misleading speeches and information created more misunderstanding domestically and
hindered success as the Iraq war continued past the expected time frame.
At the same time as the U.S. was preparing for Iraq, Al Qaeda was pushing its
own information operations against the West, by stating the West was at war against the
Ummah (Islamic community).55 This propaganda had been ongoing years before 9/11,
such as Osama Bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa declaring that the Crusader-Zionist alliance,
meaning the United States and Israel, were corrupting the way of Islam and occupying
Islamic holy sites.56 Bin Laden claimed the United States had wrongfully attacked Iraq,
referring to Operation Desert Storm. Propaganda such as this can be easily vindicated
when the U.S. does not have a message of its own countering Bin Laden. Because Bin
Laden’s statements were made in the mid-1990s, Bin Laden may have established an
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advantage of perception from the Islamic community before the U.S. decided to engage
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
However, as stated, U.S. strategists did not implement a predominant information
operations campaign along with its shock and awe strategy. Instead, as stated by Kagan,
the U.S. “is entirely focused on persuading the enemy to surrender as quickly as possible
rather than on creating the preconditions for political success after the ‘major combat
operations’ are over. It shares that flaw with network-centric warfare that with the notion
that destroying enough things of value will suffice to force any enemy to stop fighting.”57
Iraq was intended to be a small-term operation, which would end in a matter of a few
weeks. Therefore, the U.S. did not see the need to properly use IO as an effective method
in the war. However, the U.S. soon discovered Iraq was not prepared to handle
democracy as thought, but was a Pandora’s box of sectarian tensions.

Coalition Provisional Authority Orders 1 & 2
The lack of cultural understanding and information operations prior to the
invasion of Iraq left disparity towards how the Iraqi population would react to U.S.
policy. The disparity led to U.S. occupation in Iraq lasting considerably longer than
originally intended. The U.S. toppled Saddam’s regime in a matter of six weeks from the
March 20, 2003 invasion to “Mission Accomplished”, the supposed end of major combat
operations in Iraq on May 1, 2003.58 From a conventional standpoint, the U.S. was
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victorious against its enemy. However, even with the war against the Saddam’s regime
seen as a success, this did not stop the insurgency that soon emerged as a consequence of
U.S. policies that lacked awareness of ethnic tension and cultural pressure points. The
sectarian and cultural trigger points were soon ignited once the U.S. carried out certain
policies through the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Soon after “Mission Accomplished”, the objective focus was on the new Iraqi
government. Through the need for a stable Iraq government came the Coalition
Provisional Authority or CPA. Per Section one, article one of the CPA, “The CPA shall
exercise powers of the government temporarily in order to provide for the effective
administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to restore
conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can
freely determine their own political future, including by advancing governance and
facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development.”59 The
CPA was a U.S. controlled temporary government in charge or establishing a new Iraq
democracy.
The CPA’s first order came to be known as the de-Ba’athification of Iraqi society.
According to section one, “On April 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority
disestablished the Ba’ath Party of Iraq. This order implements the declaration by
eliminating the Party’s structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority
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and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisional Authority will
ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Ba’athist elements
returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are acceptable to
the people of Iraq.”60 Beyond toppling Saddam’s regime, the U.S. government also
disbanded the Ba’athist party, which at the time controlled all the government and
government related jobs.
The CPA was originally aimed at only the top most officials in the Ba’ath party.61
However, this approach was soon abandoned for a more far-encompassing version when
the new Ambassador of Iraq, Paul Bremer, was given guidance from the Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, on the necessity of the CPA orders for Iraq’s
recovery.62 At the time it was believed that de-Ba’athification was similar to the deNazification after World War II, and that ridding Iraq of a devious party was necessary
for democracy to prevail.63 Additionally, Ambassador Bremer at the time only believed
that around one percent of the Ba’ath party members, or around 20,000 total, would be
affected. Ambassador Bremer would later state that, “his order was applied in ways that
he never intended, and that many more people were purged than he had envisioned under
the original program.” 64
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This significance in Order One is in the analysis of the Ba’athist party, as it
pertained to Iraqi society. From an external standpoint, the Ba’athist party was a
nationalist party where those loyal to both Saddam and the Iraqi state would join to
promote Saddam’s cause.65 However, as explained by Andrew Terrill with the Strategic
Studies Institute, “… the justice of the de-Ba’athification order was not clear to many
Iraqis. Joining the Ba’ath party in Saddam’s Iraq was a rational decision for anyone
seeking to feed their family and live in conditions other than squalor and poverty. The
best and most numerous jobs in Iraq are found in the government and in state-controlled
enterprises such as the oil industry.”66 The postulation was that individuals joined the
Ba’ath Party because of their loyalty to Saddam and their country, however, in reality it
was difficult for one to live outside of the party. As Terrill explains, “In Iraq, a nonBa’athist primary school teacher would usually be paid the equivalent of U.S. $4 per
month, while a Ba’athist in the same position, doing the same work, would be paid
around $200 per month.”67 This disparity applied to nearly all jobs in Iraq. Being a part of
the Ba’athist party was based on necessity and not on political ideology. When the U.S.
executed Order One many Iraqis perceived the order as punishment instead of justice.
The tension was only amplified with CPA Order Two, which in section three
called for, “(1) Any military or other rank, title, or status granted to a former employee or
functionary of a Dissolved Entity by the former Regime is hereby canceled. (2) All
conscripts are released from their service obligations…”68 CPA Order Two disbanded the
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Iraqi military and, along with that, cancelled any pensions to military members who were
affiliated to the Ba’ath party. The effect of this order was that soldiers of the Iraqi
military, who had just suffered a severe loss and humiliation, were now ostracized and no
longer had a job to occupy their time. Between 30,000-50,000 individuals were purged
from the government as a direct result of CPA Orders one and two.69 The result was a top
to bottom gridlock of government functions. Schools did not have teachers to educate, all
the way to Iraq’s government, which now had no one experienced to run it.
Along with the bitterness from the Iraqi people based on the practical aspects of
being a member of the Ba’ath party that the CPA overlooked, were the cultural
dimensions that were ignored, and which played a major role in the Iraqi people’s
response to the CPA. Cultural dimensions such as how Iraqi’s identify themselves. The
assumption at the time was that Iraq was a nationalist country.70 However, this is an
oversimplification. Iraq never unified to form a national identity, but merely appeared to
be because of Saddam’s oppression and the necessity for Iraqis to be a member of the
Ba’ath party. Saddam’s oppression acted as a lid on the pressure cooker, suppressing the
sectarian tension between the Arab-Sunnis, the Shi’ites, and the Kurds.71 Therefore, when
Saddam was overthrown, it was as if lifting that oppression and allowing the sectarian
schism to erupt into conflict.
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Moreover, the Sunni-Arabs, in particular, were susceptible to the backlash
because the majority of the Ba’ath party had been, in fact, Sunni-Arab. The cultural
shakeup caused by the invasion along with the release of sectarian tension was further
enflamed when Sunni-Arabs witnessed the United States military forcing out SunniArabs from power by the CPA, without fully understanding the motive behind the
orders.72 The outcome was, “many Sunni Iraqi Arabs considered ‘de-Ba’athification,’ to
be synonymous with ‘de-Sunnization,’ a strong and deliberate effort to marginalize the
role of the Sunni Arab community in Iraq’s political future.”73 As Iraqi strategic culture
explains, power and authority are a high value as is true with many patriarchal societies.74
Therefore, the effects of the CPA were considered dishonorable and humiliating to the
Sunni-Arabs. This blowback may have been mitigated if the U.S. had prioritized analysis
of the cultural situation in Iraq, as well as messaging and influence to rally support for the
orders.
The cultural-political dynamics that the CPA overlooked when integrated led to
many of the estimated 50,000 Ba’athist members that had been disbanded seeking
revenge for the humiliation. 75 Many of the former Iraqi military had money hidden, and
contacts outside Iraq -primarily in Syria - who were willing and able to help the former
Iraqi government members seek a vendetta. The result was an insurgency that devastated
Iraq. This unintended and unexpected side effect of the de-Ba’athification resulted in the

72

Terrill, Lessons of the Iraqi De-ba'athification, 19-24
Ibid., 24
74
Tuija Saarinen, "General Cultural Differences and Stereotypes: Kurdish ..." Accessed November 12,
2016. http://wanda.uef.fi/tkk/liferay/projektit/monikko/translations/eng/Kurdilainen-perhe-ja-tapakulttuurieng.pdf, 4
75
Ibid., 21, “Unfortunately, Bremer’s estimate of 20,000 people being purged as a result of his order did
not hold up. While exact numbers are impossible to obtain, most estimates place the number as at least
30,000 and possibly up to 50,000 individuals. A few estimates place it even higher…”
73

27

Iraq operation no longer being a small-scale operation as was intended for the campaign
and created unnecessary chaos in the region.
As stated before, information operations hold a wide variety of methods to better
understand the situation in a target area, and to enhance the influence of behavior in a
conflict. Prioritizing the cultural characteristics and the psychology of a population may
have benefited the U.S. by assuring messaging and policies are translated effectively.
Information operations could have mitigated certain cultural triggers that led to the Iraqi
insurgency or may have rallied support from Iraqis as the insurgency arose. Yet, as the
interpretation was left to those affected by the CPA orders, the result was widely
negative.
Additionally, de-Ba’athification continues in Iraq, which may still lead to many
Arab-Sunnis resenting the current Iraqi government. In 2011 President Nouri al-Maliki
forced 200 Sunni-Arabs from their jobs in the Iraq government.76 The reason given for
their banishment was that the individuals relieved of duty were members of the Ba’ath
party. The significance behind this is that it demonstrates the potential for an adversary,
such as the Islamic State, to use events and policies established by the U.S. to rally
support for its agenda. As well, the continuation of de-Ba’athification could be seen as a
continuation of the U.S. influence in Iraq against the Arab-Sunnis, which could lead to
further resentment for the U.S.
Furthermore, similar to the strategic messaging prior to the invasion, the strategic
messaging for the U.S. domestically was flawed, as well. Through the invasion to 2005
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miscommunications arose about the legitimacy of the U.S. involvement in Iraq began to
escalate. As well, the lack of connections between Al-Qaeda and Saddam and the failure
to uncover any weapons of mass destruction, which had been another key justification for
the invasion, further divided the country.77 This led to a major backlash in support for
Operation Iraqi freedom internationally, as well as domestically. According to the Pew
Research Center, it was during this time, between 2005 and 2006 the majority of the U.S.
population’s view of the Iraq war began to shift negatively against continuation.78 U.S.
news coverage began reflecting this negativity, which further reinforced the message that
the United States was fighting an unjust war to the international community.79 The effects
of this anti-U. S. sentiment are still seen throughout the international community today,
and these actions shifted the perception that the U.S. was not at war against Islam, even if
U.S. policy vaguely stated it as such.80 The disunity from U.S. domestic messaging as
well as resentment abroad for the U.S. occupation in Iraq acted as counter-progressive
towards the U.S. strategic objective in the region.
The backlash from both the international community and in Iraq may have been
more damaging for the U.S. objective were it not for the U.S. adversary in Iraq, Al-Qaeda
77

Associated Press. "CIA's Final Report: No WMD Found in Iraq." April 25, 2005. Accessed December
10, 2016. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7634313/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/cias-final-report-nowmd-found-iraq/#.WEyWjRsrKUl. “in his final word, the CIA’s top weapons inspector in Iraq said
Monday that the hunt for weapons of mass destruction has ‘gone as far as feasible’ and has found
nothing…after more than 18months, the WMD investigation and debriefing of the WMD-related detainees
has been exhausted”
78
Tom Rosentiel, "Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008." Pew Research Center. March 19,
2008. Accessed December 10, 2016. http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-thewar-in-iraq-20032008/. Pew Research Center conducted a survey on three questions, and all demonstrate a
trend of negativity towards the Iraq war that shifted to the majority of the U.S. population having a negative
view in this time.
79
Associated Press. "International Support Scarce for Iraq War." Fox News. January 30, 2003. Accessed
December 10, 2016. http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/01/30/international-support-scarce-for-iraqwar.html.
80
"The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." March 2006. Accessed December 10,
2016. https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf, 9, Refers to terrorism distortion of the war on terror.

29

in Iraq (AQI) making its own strategic mistakes which allowed the U.S. an opportunity
for success. The AQI was an extension of the Al-Qaeda core that focused on brutal tactics
and savagery. 81 The next section will show how opportunities led the U.S. to use
information operations, and these opportunities had some success in winning the hearts
and minds of the Iraqi people.

The Anbar Awakening and The Surge
In the aftermath of the insurgency sparked by the CPA, came a period when
information operations began to demonstrate some success in Iraq. The first was a
controversial operation using anthropology in the war. Known as the Human Terrain
System (HTS) program, the HTS program was established in 2005 when U.S.
policymakers seeking methods to counter improvised explosive devices, “as part of an
effort to examine the sociocultural fabric behind the IED’s human networks, a proof-ofconcept program, the Cultural Preparation of the Environment, was created…”82 The
cultural preparation of the environment stimulated the desire for the U.S. to focus on
sociocultural data on Iraq and Afghanistan. To handle this new tasking, the U.S. military
recruited anthropologists to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan to collect and analyze this
data.
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The anthropologists were embedded with tactical elements and aided U.S. tactical
leadership by providing a cultural or political understanding to improve communication
with the Iraqi people.83 The effect of the program was to improve the ability of U.S.
troops to effectively navigate the human terrain of Iraq, and thereby to advance key U.S.
objectives. As Christopher Sims with the U.S. Army War College best explains, “cultural
misunderstandings and failure to understand how the society functioned is this area had
the potential to turn neutral (or even supportive) groups of people against the coalition
and to the other side of the insurgents.”84 At its peak, the HTS program had embedded
anthropologists with 28 teams in Iraq.85 Having these teams assisted U.S. troops to ensure
the conduct and behavior of the U.S. troops would avoid triggering undesired responses
from the Iraqi people.
An example of the cultural benefits anthropologists contributed to U.S. troops
occurred with the patriarchal aspects of Iraqi society. Iraqis value elders who are strong
and authoritative, which to them are the traits of a leader.86 Because of this, it was
imperative that U.S. leader’s demeanor articulated this manner, and do conduct
themselves authoritatively, which included avoiding such customs as leadership
deliberating amongst each other when amongst Iraqi leaders. A leader discussing issues
or taking opinions on tactics and options could be perceived as weak, therefore, not a
person the Iraqis want to deal with. Key strategic cultural insights such as leadership
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emphasizing authoritative mannerism were crucial in winning the hearts and minds of the
Iraqi people. The HTS endowed U.S. troops with that insight, as Christopher Sims further
explains, “in actuality, the HTS embedded teams actually created the skill sets and
practical experience that the program sought in the first place.”87 Gathering strategic
cultural intelligence such as this allows tactical units’ enhanced mobility throughout the
human terrain, ultimately advancing U.S. strategy in part.
The success of the human terrain system demonstrates its necessity with any
operation concerning winning the hearts and minds of a population. Additionally, “HTS
is not simply a program for Iraq and Afghanistan, but a tool for all regions of strategic
interest to the U.S. Army.”88 Different cultures communicate in different ways. Knowing
the human terrain in Iraq mitigates the chance of miscommunication, and helps ensures
that the U.S. objective is met. Furthermore, programs such as the HTS adds value to any
operation, more emphasis on such projects in conflicts such as the Iraq insurgency, or the
conflict with the Islamic State and the foreign fighter issue, must be discussed.
Nevertheless, the HTS program received heavy criticism domestically, primarily
among the academic anthropology community, who begrudged the concept of the U.S.
“weaponizing anthropology” and believed that using anthropology in this manner
violated the anthropologist code of ethics.89 The resentment from the academic
community was only made worse by the death of Paula Loyd, an anthropologist working
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in Afghanistan who was set on fire by insurgents.90 The brutality surrounding her death,
and the reaction of her colleague who had promptly executed the terrorist, led to an even
stronger backlash from the community. The HTS was ultimately shutdown on September
30, 2014. The reason given for the termination was the U.S. no longer saw the need for
the program in either theater.91 Abandonment of the HTS program may have negative
consequences as the U.S. still has 8,400 troops deployed in Afghanistan and will stay in
country until 2024.92 The outcome of canceling the HTS program has yet to be seen
although many have argued, including reports from the National Defense University, that
canceling the program was a grave mistake.93
However, the HTS was not the only successful utilization of information
operations during the Operation Iraqi Freedom. Another successful use of IO was the
Sons of Iraq campaign (SOI). In 2006, stability in Iraq was scarce. Soldiers were facing
multiple threats and daily attacks. However, at the same time as this, the AQI had also
begun receiving opposition in the Anbar province of Iraq.94 The leader of AQI was Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who spent his teenage years until the end of his life as a
“nationless freelance terrorist.”95 Zarqawi was a foreign fighter, who moved to
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Afghanistan in 1989 to fight in the Soviet-Afghan war. It was in Afghanistan where
Zarqawi began to resent the Al Qaeda objective in fighting “the far enemy” and wanted
to focus on “the near enemy,” which to him were apostates.96 By 2001, Zarqawi and
what would later become AQI were operating in the al-Anbar province of Iraq, which is
primarily Sunni-Arab, AQI’s primary source of recruitment and support.
The Anbar province is where much of the insurgency took place. This made the
Anbar province, and with it the Sunni-Arabs, a key factor in the outcome of the Iraq war.
However, the AQI had used several brutal tactics against its enemies, who were often
fellow Muslims that the AQI determined were the enemy of Allah. These tactics included
various methods of torture, the killings of entire families, and mass bombings.97 The
legacy that AQI left is carried on by its successor, the Islamic State.
The sheer violence of the AQI on fellow Muslims produced a backlash from the
Anbar Province.98 This backlash came to be known as the Anbar Awakening. The Anbar
Awakening consisted of mainly Sunni-Arab tribes throughout the Anbar province setting
aside differences, and uniting to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq.99 As well, the Sunni-Arab
Muslims controlled support lines for the insurgency, as access routes for supplies and
foreign fighters went primarily through the Anbar province.100 Best explained by
Kimberly Kagan with the Institute for the Study of War, “Anbar Province stretches west
of Baghdad to Iraq’s borders with Syria and Jordan. Foreign fighters flow from those

96

Ibid.
Ibid.
98
Kirdar, “Al Qaeda in Iraq", 5
99
Ibid., 5
100
Kimberly Kagan, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing Al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq."
Accessed December 10, 2016.
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/IraqReport03.pdf, 3
97

34

borders toward Baghdad. The Euphrates River Valley constitutes the main line of
communication in Anbar province… these lines of communication link the major towns
of the western Euphrates with the cities of northern Iraq in which former Baathist regime
elements and al Qaeda [AQI] once operated and still operate.”101 The Anbar province
held strategic value in both land and support for AQI and the insurgency. However,
disregarding the value of the support of the population, Zarqawi continued his reign of
terror in Iraq. Zarqawi was eventually killed north of Baghdad when U.S. forces launched
a drone strike on a safe house102. The result of both AQI’s brutality and the death of
Zarqawi provided and opportunity for General David Petraeus to conduct an information
operation in the conflict, known as the Son of Iraq campaign.
As Kimberley Kagan goes on to say, the U.S. was able to exploit the resentment
of AQI by forming the Sons of Iraq campaign alongside the awakening.103 This was
primarily done with the support of General David Petraeus, who at the time was the
leader of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which as stated before holds
responsibility for military activities in the Middle East.104 General Petraeus realized that
motivating the Sunni-Arab tribes in the Anbar province to fight together with the U.S.
would result in less U.S. casualties and would be more financially efficient than the
strategy at the time.105 This campaign attempted to shift the focus of the U.S. being as the
invading enemy to U.S. forces aiding the Iraqi population to fight off insurgents.
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The Sons of Iraq objective was for the U.S. military to seek out tribal leaders in
the Anbar province and Baghdad to offer U.S. assistance in training and financing Iraqi
militias in their effort to combat AQI. The result was, “By 2008, more than 95,000
citizens had joined the anti-al-Qaeda movement… roughly 80 percent of the forces are
Sunni; 19 percent are Shiite. It is estimated that 91,000 [were] under contract with the
coalition forces, each receiving the equivalent of $300 in U.S. currency a month…”106
The ability to influence such a high volume of individuals in a combat theater benefited
the U.S. strategy in Iraq. The understanding of both key tactical and strategic issues, such
as both AQI’s operations and conduct, as well as the Sunni-Arab tribal structure and
social values can play a substantial role in the war on terror.
The Sons of Iraq campaign was largely successful in achieving its objectives. The
campaign was a large demonstration how understanding the sociological mentality of a
community and influence can work to the U.S. advantage. One article by the Institute for
the Study of War argued, “On the whole, the Sons of Iraq program has been a major asset
in the struggle to bring security to the Iraqi population… the Sons of Iraq program have
allowed overstretched Coalition and Iraqi forces to accomplish more than they would
have been able to otherwise on the security front.”107 The significance behind the Sons of
Iraq campaign is that it demonstrates how the U.S. does not need to focus on large
conventional military operations to accomplish strategic objectives in the theater of war
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but does need to comprehensively understand and take into account the psychological and
sociological aspects of the population inside the theater of war.
Additionally, as this campaign was largely based on motivating local nationals to
become engaged in counterinsurgency operations, the Sons of Iraq campaign
demonstrates that certain societies may be motivated more by other aspects than purely
political issues or the deterrence stemming from U.S. military dominance. Awareness of
the temperament of the local nationals was more significant than assuming U.S.
conventional forces would be sufficient to establish stability. This assertion is supported
by the Institute for the Study of War’s statement, “The Coalition successfully exploited
this rift between the most radical insurgent groups and the tribal leaders and populations.
Thus, they turned formerly passive supporters as well as some former insurgents into
active supporters of the counterinsurgency effort.”108 The Sons of Iraq campaign
motivated individuals in ways that U.S. conventional superiority could not.
At the same time as the Sons of Iraq campaign was showing success, however,
media coverage of the war did not necessarily reflect progress. Akin to the CPA and the
invasion, the media coverage, in certain ways, compensated for the lack of IO in theater.
However, the information covered did not benefit the U.S. both domestically or abroad,
but was comprised of negativity towards the U.S.109 This, along with new misleading
information and stereotypes, such as the U.S.’s involvement being solely oil driven,
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further pushed a negative message about the United States.110 Global media coverage
influences perspectives on an issue, especially if there is no competing message being
given. The lack of strategic messaging or an effective IO campaign beyond inside Iraq
allows opportunities for adversaries in the war of ideas. Although the U.S. managed some
success in influencing towards combating the AQI in Iraq, the radical ideology behind
AQI is not limited to border constraints. Therefore, the success in defeating Al Qaeda in
Iraq does not mean AQI ideology is also destroyed.
The success in the Sons of Iraq campaign along with the HTS dealt a significant
blow to both Al Qaeda in Iraq. The AQI was largely degraded after the surge and Anbar
awakening and had the U.S. emphasized on destroying the ideology as a whole behind
the organization, the ultimate result may have been a complete victory against AQI.
However, history has shown this was not the case. The AQI ultimately appointed a new
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and AQI mutated into the Islamic State that currently
plagues Iraq today.111 As well, the Al Qaeda core was degraded from both the U.S.
victory over AQI and the effect of AQI’s savagery had for the Al Qaeda image.112 The
lack of support AQI received in the Anbar province as a result of its brutality carried over
to the Al Qaeda group as a whole. The success of the U.S. forced the Al Qaeda core to go
underground. As with the AQI, had the U.S. taken advantage of this moment to mitigate
radical ideology, the U.S. may have ultimate defeated Al Qaeda altogether. However, this
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was not the case and Al Qaeda managed to return and currently holds more territory than
ever before.113 Although disbanded, Al Qaeda has taken the opportunity to rebrand its
image post-U.S. occupation in Iraq and has begun to reemerge.

The Withdrawal Of U.S. Forces from Iraq
Both campaigns continued until the withdraw of U.S. forces from Iraq, however,
it began tapering off around 2009.114 The decision to reduce these operations was based
on multiple reasons, such as a new administration coming in, the end of the surge in Iraq,
and a stronger focus in Afghanistan.115 At this point in time, the focus shifted from
winning the hearts and minds, or complete victory in the Global War on Terror, to rapid
withdrawal. The quick withdrawal from Iraq had stark consequences for the U.S. and the
Global War on Terror as well.
Much about the consequences of the withdrawal from Iraq stem from the training
that the Iraqi population received during U.S. occupation. As has been revealed now, the
Iraqi military personnel had not undergone enough time using U.S. equipment and
training to become comfortable with many of the new technologies or methods they had
been trained in. This left many of the Iraq military to abandon vehicles and military
tactics, as they are not inclined or accustomed to making repairs or maintaining complex
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mechanical equipment.116 Instead, they have resorted to the methods and technology they
are familiar with, which is often inferior. Along with technology, the Iraqi people also did
not have sufficient time to develop their society to the standards the U.S. had hoped for.
The U.S. emphasis on equipment training over allowing time for the Iraqi population to
become embedded with familiarization of the applications may have been the result of
U.S. policy makers seeking to demonstrate the success of the operation domestically over
long-term ramifications.
However, the Iraq war was not seen as any type of victory for the U.S. Both
domestically and abroad, the Iraq war was often viewed as a loss for the United States,
compared often to the war in Vietnam.117 Whether Iraq was a victory for the United
States or a disaster is still widely debated in the contemporary political arena, as it was in
2011 when the last of U.S. forces withdrew.118 According to some observers, the
outcome of the war in had a lasting strategic effect on U.S. credibility on a global
scale.119 Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. has been more hesitant to proactively
engage on issues in the Middle East. This could be due to fear of being seen as making
similar mistakes as the U.S. had recently done.
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Moreover, the lack of a strategic message in the withdrawal of Iraq allowed for
messages of the U.S. losing the war to flourish without contradiction. This is in part,
along with the confusion among the general population as to the U.S.’s true mission in
Iraq, as well as the contentiousness surrounding the success of OIF. To date, many
among the U.S. general population have negative opinions towards Iraq.120 This creates
conflict and resentment, even among the White House administration and Congress.
However, instead of addressing some of the confusion in an effort to mitigate these
issues, policymakers tend to not address it, perhaps not wanting to deal with the political
complications it would create trying to inform the public. As well, the contention
surrounding Iraq has been and still is used for political purposes, as was seen in the recent
2016 presidential election.121 The result is has been inconsistent or a lack of information
overall, which allows for more anti-American propaganda and information to fill in the
gaps.

Conclusion
When considering the necessity of information operations in Operation Iraqi
Freedom it is best to perceive the war from the perspective that the U.S.’s regime change
operations holds similarities to an insurgency against Saddam’s regime. Because of the
nature of insurgency or revolutionary warfare, information operations was needed equally
if not more than all other aspects in such an operation. As Frederick Kagan explains,
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“insurgency and revolutionary war are terms that describe the political purpose of
military undertakings… revolutionary wars (or insurgencies) are not duels, but triangular
struggles. Two sides compete with one another in order to gain the support of the bulk of
the population. The triangular nature of these conflicts helps explain why
counterinsurgency efforts focused primarily on defeating the armed forces of the rebels
generally fail, while successful examples normally involve positive efforts to win over
the populations.”122 Kagan goes on to contend that an insurgency’s objective is to both
discredit the existing regime and to establish an alternative. For these reasons, the
primary objective of any insurgency or regime change war is to win over the hearts and
minds of a population.
Likewise, viewing the operation from this perspective sheds light on lessons
learned for U.S. strategy. Kagan best exposes this saying, “successful revolutionaries do
not, on the whole, wait until they have taken power or are on the verge of doing so before
deciding what their new government will look like and how they will win the support of
the population for it. On the contrary, the vision of the new order is frequently what
motivate revolutionaries to fight in the first place.”123 The United States viewed itself as a
revolutionary power to the Iraqi people. Therefore, it was imperative from the beginning
that the U.S. helped the Iraqi people to understand the new vision the U.S. had for Iraq,
and why they should support it. Failure to communicate and influence the behavior in the
country is what facilitated more conflict, and ultimately to an indecisive outcome.
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As the next chapter will show, the U.S. has yet to effectively utilize information
operations in the Iraqi theater against the Islamic State, a similar enemy it fought in Iraq.
The Islamic State’s is currently conducting its own information operation through the use
of propaganda and the Internet has given it a global reach and placed it as one of the most
successful terrorist organizations in history.124 As stated in the beginning of this paper,
the Islamic State has been able to successfully use the terrorism tactic throughout Europe,
and inside the United States. As well, the number of ongoing investigations of supporters
of the Islamic State is increasing, doubling from 2015 to 2016.125 This expresses that the
U.S. is losing the war of ideas, despite its conventional might, and global reach. As the
United States begins to seek new ways in defeating terrorism, whether globally or
regionally, it must strongly consider how its actions are going to be viewed through the
population it is affecting. Information operations and strategic communications are
designed to do that.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ISLAMIC STATE

The lack of information operations and strategic communications throughout
Operation Iraqi Freedom, along with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq before the
government was stable, left Iraq vulnerable. A weak Shia government, along with a
marginalized Sunni-Arab population, created a suitable environment for organizations
such as AQI’s successor, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) to wedge itself into the psyche of
a new country looking for stability. From 2006 the AQI was heavily degraded from U.S.
forces in the area. Yet, despite the organizations seemingly defeat and unpopularity, a
man calling himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, claimed leadership of the organization in
2010. From there, Baghdadi inaugurated the restoration of the ISI’s structure and
resources to reform it.126 This next chapter spotlights the Islamic State’s amelioration, its
ideology, its information operation, and current U.S. strategies against both the Islamic
State and the foreign fighter’s dilemma along with it.

The Emergence Of The Islamic State
Throughout the drawdown in Iraq in 2009 to 2011 Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which
had received a major setback due to the killing of Zarqawi and the Anbar Awakening as
discussed in the previous chapter, was in a state of decay. The successor of Zarqawi after
his death in 2006, an Egyptian named Abu Ayub al-Masri, had not managed to rally the
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same level of commitment or motivation from AQI or the surrounding population.127 The
Coalition forces, along with the Anbar Awakening had managed to cripple the majority
of AQI support, and by 2008, “coalition and local security forces had killed 2,400 AQI
members and taken 8,800 prisoners. By spring 2009, the U.S. was funding around
100,000 local Sunnis to fight AQI. The local fighters carried out a campaign against the
group, assassinating members and warning others not to work with the group. By June,
2010, AQI had lost stable communication with AQ leadership, and 36 of AQI’s 42
leaders had been killed or captured. Through 2011, Coalition forces continued to
coordinate efforts with tribal security forces, killing the majority of AQI’s leadership and
leaving it in general disarray.”128 Around this time the leaders of the then ISI, Abu Ayub
al-Masri, and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, were both killed in a joint U.S. -Iraqi raid on April
18, 2010.129 Shortly after the killing of Masri and Baghdadi a new leader was appointed,
who called himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Baghdadi was born Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri in 1971 near Samarra.130
From an early age, Badri was known for his devoted nature towards sharia law and the
Islamic faith.131 He led chanting sessions with neighborhood children, attended mosque
lectures regularly, and enrolled at Saddam University in Iraq for Quranic Studies. During
his Ph.D. program, Badri joined the Muslim Brotherhood, although not initially favoring
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the Jihadist side of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Badri quickly fell in line with the
more conservative side, feeling that any state that did not adhere to sharia law was an
apostate (renounced religious faith).132 By the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003, Badri
was known for being angrily intolerant of un-Islamic behavior.
It did not take long after the U.S. invasion for Badri to mobilize an insurgency
group. Named Jaysh Ahl al-Sunna, this group fought against the U.S. in the Anbar
Province throughout the invasion till 2004.133 However, by February 2004, Badri was
arrested while in Fallujah. At the time Badri was not a well-known combatant by the U.S.
coalition forces and was released after 10 months. However, Badri managed to leave
from his incarceration with more connections and information to fight with the
insurgency than before.134 Soon after his release, Badri joined Al Qaeda in Iraq. From
there, Badri’s connections along with his education in Quranic verses accelerated his
position near a top level in AQI. After the death of the then leaders, Masri and Abu Umar
al-Baghdadi, Badri was appointed as interim leader.
During the time that Badri became the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq, multiple
things occurred that allowed for the reemergence of this organization. First, was the quick
withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq, as previously discussed. Second, was
the fragile Shi’ite dominated government in Iraq, which further fueled sectarian
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tension.135 Third, was the Arab Spring, which sparked a civil war in Syria.136 These
events fashioned a fertile environment for the Islamic State in Iraqi (ISI) to begin
recruiting new followers in the region, who had deep seeded grievances with the affairs
inside and surrounding Iraq.
However, instead of attacking the Iraqi government first, Badri focused attention
on recruiting in Iraq to fight in Syria, where by 2013 the civil war had devastated the
country. Badri realized an opportunity by changing the ISI to the Islamic State of Iraq and
Al Sham (ISIS), Badri managed to expand ISIS’s power in the region.137 The significance
in renaming the organization is that Al-Sham is a holy Islamic site in Syria, where,
according to Islamic eschatology, a great apocalyptic battle between the West and Islam
will be waged.138 It was at the time of the rebrand that ISIS also separated itself from the
Al Qaeda core, and began fighting on multiple fronts in both Syria and Iraq. By January
2014, ISIS had seized the Iraqi city of Fallujah, and by March had taken Mosul. It was in
Mosul on June 29, 2014 that Badri, who had by then changed his name to Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, proclaimed himself the Caliph of the Islamic State.139
Since its declaration, the Islamic State has continued to hold territory and promote
its radical ideology both within its occupied territory and abroad. In addition to enforcing
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strict Sharia law inside its occupied territory, the Islamic State, “seeks to eradicate
obstacles to restoring God's rule on Earth and to defend the Muslim community, or
Umma, against infidels and apostate,” as one BBC article demonstrates.140 In just a few
short years the Islamic State has become a legitimate threat to what little stability the
Middle East holds. Although there have been signs of the Islamic State beginning to fail,
the emerging issue is how the Islamic State’s downfall will affect fighters wanting to join
the Islamic State’s cause. At the time this thesis was written the fate of the battle of
Mosul has still not been determined.
However, at the height of power, the Islamic State controlled an area roughly
equal to the size of the United Kingdom.141 The Islamic State continued the same ruthless
methods as its predecessor. By 2014, the Al-Qaeda core disavowed the Islamic State
because the savage tactics that the Islamic State was implementing towards fellow
Muslims. The Al Qaeda core postulated that the Islamic State’s tactics were so brutal it
risked losing the Muslim hearts and minds.142 The organization's tactics, such as
crucifixions, torture, and public executions created an international protest towards the
Islamic State. Regional powers, such as Iran, Syria, and many of the elites in Saudi
Arabia have condemned the organization, and many state actors have joined in to help
eliminate it. Yet, despite this claim that the Islamic State is too radical or too savage, the
organization grew immensely.
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In addition, the Islamic State has recruited heavily from both within the Middle
East and abroad, including from the West to Muslims who may sympathize with the
Islamic State’s ideology. The recruitment of foreign fighters has been successful in the
Islamic State through its massive propaganda campaign and the use of new technologies,
such as social media. The Islamic State’s ideology and information operations have
allowed it to thrive in the Middle East, and inspire violence abroad.

The Islamic State’s Ideology
As best articulated by Major General Michael Nagata, former special operations
commander of U.S. Central Command, “We do not understand the movement [i.e., the
Islamic State], and until we do, we are not going to defeat it… We have not defeated the
idea. We do not even understand the idea.”143 The Islamic State has managed to both
keep dedicated to its brutality and hold a notable amount of territory. Much of the
reasoning behind the Islamic State’s success derives from its ideology appealing to
supporters or suppressing resistance. The Islamic State’s ideology has struck a nerve with
those inside its occupied territory, and those abroad who are susceptible to the Islamic
State’s dogma. This ideology is not entirely unique to the Islamic State alone but is
rooted in a dogma that may tempt those Islamists who no longer have the patience for the
eventual time when Islam is the dominant religion again. The Islamic State calls for
action, and its creed and actions have been seducing many who feel the contemporary
international arena calls for both.
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To understand how the Islamic State has been successful in radicalizing and
mobilizing individuals abroad, the creed must be understood. As Cole Brunzel with the
Brookings Institute states, “that [the Islamic States] ideology should be understood on
two levels. The first is Jihadi-Salafism, the school of Islamic political thought to which
the group belongs. The second level is the Islamic State’s hardline orientation within this
school, which is to a large degree what separates it from al-Qaeda today.”144 The first
dimension of the Islamic State’s ideology is that it originated from severe interpretations
of the Quran. This creed is one of complete conviction, in an attempt to create a “pure
version” of the Islamic religion.145
The Salafist religion is a ultra-fundamentalist form of Sunni Islamism, which
believes that a Muslim’s life should be centered around Sharia, or “the path”, of Islamic
law and values.146 Sharia law follows a strict set of moral laws and values that date back
to the prophet Mohammad’s time.147 However, where Salafist distinguish themselves
beyond mainstream Islamism is that they believe the only true form of Islam is the one
that was established at the time of the Prophet Mohammad.148 The difference is where an
Islamist will conduct its life according to sharia, a Salafist follows the law of sharia, “to
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the letter.”149 Salafists are the “ultraconservatives” of the Islamic world. As David
Kirkpatrick with the New York Times stated, “the Islamic State disdains other Islamists
who reason by analogy to adapt to changing context...”150 The Islamic State follows the
most stringent of Salafi beliefs, and in addition to having low tolerance if any for the
infidel [nonbeliever] or Shi’ites, the Islamic State has more resentment towards Sunni
Muslims who do not join the Islamic State. The Islamic State’s disdain for unsupportive
Sunni Muslims was seen with the Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kaseasbeh, who was shot
down in Syria and burned alive by the Islamic State.151 As Sebastian Gorka, a current
Whitehouse advisor and expert in irregular warfare stated in a lecture on the Islamic State
that Kaseabeh was burned alive instead of beheaded because he was a Sunni Muslim who
went against the caliphate. In the reasoning of the Islamic State, Kaseabeh should have
known better because he was a Sunni.152 In the Islamic State, Kaseabeh was seen as a
traitor, and burning him alive was following sharia law punishments for traitors.
Further implications of how the Islamic State practices Salafism emanates from
the consideration of where the Islamic State controls the territory, as well as whom could
be susceptible to its message. The Islamic State controls territory inhabited by a major
Arab-Sunni population.153 Even with the Arab-Sunni population in the Islamic State
occupied territory exceeds 10 million individuals the Islamic State has managed to be
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successful in its domination. The significance in this is it appears as though the ArabSunni population is allowing itself to be controlled by the Islamic State’s government.
This could suggest a general acceptance within the Arab-Sunni culture in Iraq of more
radical philosophy.
Additionally, the allowance by the Arab-Sunnis for the Islamic State to control
inhabited territory may also demonstrate that Arab-Sunni sects in Iraq culturally identify
with their ethnicity and religion over a state government.154 The strategic effect of this is
the longer the Islamic State maintains an ideological influence in the region, the more
likely younger generations of Iraqis will carry on that same philosophy and violence.
Additionally, the Iraqi and Syrian government will have increasing little influence in the
area as Iraqi Sunni-Arabs do not separate church and state, but view all political decisions
through a religious lens. As well, the ramifications of this will affect both the culture in
the Middle East and the state sovereignty in the region.
As Samuel P. Huntington, a former NSC member and Harvard professor of
political science hypothesized the new global conflict, “will be cultural.”155 His thesis
may prove true as much of what is happening in the Middle East has more to do with
cultural conflict than with conventional issues, such as state sovereignty or resources. To
the West, the principle actors in global affairs are the nation states. This concept is
relatively new, being only a few centuries old originating from the Treaty of
Westphalia.156 Since the adoption of the treaty, the West has shifted attention towards
international relations being conducted by state actors and has acquired the philosophy of
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separating church and state. However, the majority of the Islamic community in the
Middle East, does not perceive governance or international affairs in the same manner.
Bernard Lewis, a historian and former professor at Princeton in Near Eastern Studies, has
stated, regarding politics in the Middle East, “God is in principle the sovereign, the
supreme head of the Islamic state—and the Prophet and, after the Prophet, the caliphs are
his vicegerents—then God as sovereign commands the army.”157 To the Islamic
community in the Middle East the land is governed by the Islamic god and by the dogma
of the Quran. When a Middle Eastern inhabitant has an issue with the governing body or
defies a law, it is often looked at by the society as that citizen defied his or her religion.
Similarly, when an outside culture involves itself in Middle Eastern affairs, through
diplomacy or military interaction, those actions are not seen by the Islamic community as
simply the interaction among state actors, but intervening with a religion.
Overlooking the cultural sensitivities in the Middle East has led to ill views of the
U.S. in the region. As Lewis stipulates,” The Muslim has suffered successive stages of
defeat. The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of
Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority in his own
country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes
even foreign rulers or settlers, and the enfranchisement of native non-Muslim
elements.”158 Further intervention from foreign cultures could cause a “stand your
ground,” temperament from the Islamic community, which allows groups such as the
Islamic State to rally support as they fight off outside forces. It is important to understand
the impact that historical events have had in the Middle East and with Muslims globally.
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The Islamic State’s conviction can entice a quest for revenge from both Muslims living
under the Islamic States rule, as well as those susceptible to being charmed by the Islamic
States rhetoric. The Islamic State is at the core of its bearing an Islamist movement.
Although many Islamists have negative views towards the Islamic State, there can be no
denying that the Islamic State is acting in accordance with certain Quranic teachings,
such a submission to Allah and Allah being a part of everyday life.159 As stated before,
many of the types of violence used by the Islamic State directly come from Quranic
verses, and how Islamic leaders treated adversaries. Therefore, consideration on how
Islamists perceive the Islamic State, as well as looking into the ideology the Islamic State
is preaching is of the utmost importance.
However, the establishment of the caliphate is not the only task on the Islamic
State’s agenda. The second main ideological dimension of the Islamic State deals with its
goal, which goes far beyond the establishment of a caliphate to an apparent glorious
apocalyptic battle between the true believers and the West.160 As has been stated in
multiple Islamic State propaganda videos and text the Islamic State believes, “…that the
armies of Rome [the West] will mass to meet the armies of Islam in northern Syria; and
that Islam’s final showdown with the anti-Messiah will occur in Jerusalem after a period
of renewed Islamic conquest. The Islamic State has attached great importance to the
Syrian City of Dabiq, near Aleppo… the Islamic State’s propagandists drool with
anticipation of this event, and constantly imply that it will come soon”, as an article by
Graeme Wood with the Atlantic states.161 The Islamic State preaches a final battle in
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which the true believers will be victorious against the Western nonbelievers, which will
result in a global Caliphate in the post-apocalyptic world. These messages, such as an
apocalyptic battle between the Western crusaders and the true believers, while holding a
territory, has had a seductive effect from foreign fighters abroad, whom desire a fight on
a biblical scale, generates motivation to join.162 To combat this seduction, the U.S. must
implement a multispectral strategy targeting all aspects of the Islamic State. Currently,
the U.S. is focused on dismantling the Islamic State’s territory, but the ideology behind it
must also be addressed and overcome. Overcoming the ideology ensures that the radical
ideology behind the Islamic State dies with it and does not reemerge in ten years as
another extremist group with the same agenda.

How the Islamic State Differs from Al Qaeda
The Islamic State has long since cut the umbilical cord with Al Qaeda and has
evolved into a separate entity unto itself. This is important to acknowledge when
considering the foreign fighter issue and how the Islamic State is doing so well in
recruiting, and because the policies targeting Al Qaeda may not work regarding the
Islamic State. The Islamic State embraces many characteristics that are vastly different
from the Al Qaeda core, and therefore, constructing policies aimed at the defeat of the
Islamic State ought to appreciate the differences.
The first principal difference between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda is who the
organizations view as their target. Al Qaeda from the beginning has been concerned with
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the far enemy, meaning the United States.163 As Daniel Byman, an expert on foreign
policy and the Middle East stated in his testimony before the Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House Committee on Homeland Security,
“Building a caliphate was more of a long-term goal than an immediate objective’. The
AQ core’s goal was first to fight the ‘far enemy’ and then eventually in the long-term
would establish a caliphate.”164 Al Qaeda’s goal of attacking the U.S. along with its
strategic patience for the caliphate indicates Al Qaeda is more of a threat against the U.S.
homeland.
Divergent from Al Qaeda, the Islamic State does not look at the U.S. as its
primary objective. The Islamic State’s primary focus has been in the Middle Eastern
region. This has been true of the Islamic State even when it was still under the Al Qaeda
name. As Daniel Byman explains again, “Yet even in its [The Islamic State’s] early days
the group bickered with the Al Qaeda leadership. Zawahiri and Bin Laden pushed for a
focus on U.S. targets while Zarqawi (and those who took his place after his death in 2006
from a U.S. air strike) emphasized sectarian war and attacks on Sunni Muslims deemed
apostates, such as those who collaborated with the Shi’a-led regime.”165 This
demonstrates that from the beginning, the Islamic State was more focused on its region
and apostate regimes. The result of this is that Al Qaeda may be more of a threat to the
U.S. homeland, but the Islamic State’s agenda will be destabilizing in the Middle East, in
which the U.S. has a substantial investment.166
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Recognizing the Islamic State’s main agenda also means that although the Islamic
State has inspired attacks inside the United States, most notably San Bernardino, CA and
Orlando, FL, these are not the planning and coordination of the Islamic State as much as
opportunities seized from individuals radicalized. This understanding affects U.S. policy
when considering that those watching the Islamic State with interest may form the
opinion that the Islamic State is handling regional matters, or the U.S. is forcing its
presence on Islamic matters. Those who are susceptible to join the Islamic State may be
persuaded further to join if the message being shown is of the Islamic State focused on
regional affairs, and then watching the U.S. conduct air strikes in defense of the U.S. The
message becomes distorted and could push individuals further towards the Islamic State’s
ideology.
Along with the difference in targets between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is the
difference centered around when the caliphate should be established. The Islamic State’s
objective is for the caliphate to be realized now, and it has succeeded in constructing it.167
There is no more waiting for a caliphate to emerge. The caliphate can be seen on a map.
This is significant for two main reasons. First, it is significant because no terrorist
organization has ever done this before.168 All other terrorist groups, from the Muslim
Brotherhood to Al Qaeda have continued with the message of fighting and defeating the
enemy first, and then the caliphate will eventually be established. In this sense, the
Islamic State has done what no other terrorist group has done before, which alone is
significant.
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The second significant factor in this is how enticing having a tangible caliphate
looks to foreign fighters and potential converts who see the Islamic State making this
stand.169 A fully established caliphate affects those who are impatient towards Islam’s
resurgence of the power and status it once had. Having the caliphate now is rallying a call
to action to all the Muslims on a global scale. To those who have watched the Middle
East be influenced by so-called “apostates” or the West, strategic patience has not paid
off. Instead, potential foreign fighters abroad are witnessing an organization claim what
no other group has claimed before. It further pushes the message that the time to act is
now, and the Islamic State’s caliphate requires the help from the true believers. This may
have had a tangible impact on those who are inclined to join such a cause.

The Islamic State’s Use of Propaganda
The Islamic State’s accomplishment in rallying support from outside its occupied
territory emanates largely from its information operations campaign, which could
potentially be destructive to U.S. foreign policy if a counter operation is not executed
properly. Although the Islamic State is not the first group to use this strategy, the Islamic
State has used social media far more successfully than any other terrorist organization in
history.170 Currently, the Islamic State is losing territory. However, the loss of territory
does not necessarily deter veteran foreign fighters whom may scatter after the end of the
Islamic State, nor does losing territory necessarily correlate to a loss in the ideology of
the Islamic State. The longer the Islamic manages to continue pushing its propaganda, the
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more likely the messages carried through the Islamic State will continue long after the
Islamic States defeat.
The Islamic State began its own social media campaign in 2012 with a “36minute video titled ‘The Expedition of the Prisoners, #1,’ released in January by the
group’s Al-Furqan media outlet. This video was a collection of clips of varying technical
quality from Arab and Western broadcast media and is clearly intended for the Iraqi
Sunni audience. It begins with the American ‘crusaders’ handing over Iraq to the
Iranian…”171 The timing of this video being released roughly a month after the last of
U.S. and coalition forces withdrew from Iraq is not a coincidence. The end of Operation
Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn departed leaving Iraq comprised with a weak government
and sectarian tension. Furthermore, the audience the Islamic State sought out was the
same individuals the Islamic State currently has control over, which is the Iraqi ArabSunni community.172 This video reached out to the hearts and minds of a culture, which
as shown in chapter two, lost much of its sense of identity when CPA orders one and two
cast out the Arab-Sunni tribe. The Islamic State capitalized on Iraqi Arab-Sunni’s
vulnerability.
From the 2012 video, the Islamic State in Iraq released several more “Expedition
of the Prisoner” videos, which comprised of crude clips taken from other news sources
and spliced together. These videos showed the U.S. offering Iraq to the Iranians while
arguing that the Iraqi Sunni’s were, “… raised for many years by the mujahedeen, and
‘only by the barrage of bullets and the spilling of blood’ will the injustice and humiliation
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come to an end.”173 However, it was not until 2013 that the Islamic State began heavily
investing in a social media campaign as well as focus on improved quality propaganda
videos.174 Additionally, by this time the Islamic State had discontinued the hijacking of
video clips from other media sites and began filming self-made propaganda videos. The
Islamic State propaganda aimed to show four distinct messages: the current situation of
Arab-Sunnis being killed; motivating viewers to come join the cause; demonstrating that
the Islamic State is the legitimate caliphate; and showing that the Islamic State will be
victorious in its agenda.175
Once the caliphate was established in 2014, the propaganda clips communicated
beyond images of beheadings and violence often seen in the U.S. media, to promote the
benefits of living in the Islamic State’s caliphate. Much of how the Islamic State
attempted to define itself and still tries to convey, was by how well Islamic State citizens
lived inside the caliphate. As Mr. Alberto Fernandez with the Brookings Institute shows,
the Islamic State even went as far as to, “releasing Arabic-language propaganda about
corruption and human rights abuses by the Iraqi government to English and Germanlanguage propaganda focused on changing the hearts of men. As one expert noted about
ISIS songwriting, ‘The Islamic State’s nasheeds are not defense at all. They are about a
hope to change the world forever.”176 Messages are conveyed, making a difference in the
world and appealing to those who are seeking something greater than themselves plays a
key role in recruiting for the Islamic State, as this thesis will discuss in chapter four.
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In addition to the messages which are broadcasted stands the question of how
often the messages are propagated through the Internet. The Islamic State’s utilization of
social media sights such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook contribute to the Islamic
State’s global influence.177 At the height of the Islamic State’s usage of social media,
there were nearly 40,000 tweets posted per day in support of the Islamic State.178
Additionally, in 2015 the Islamic State released upwards of 38 new items per day,
including 20-minute propaganda videos, full-length documentaries, photo essays, audio
clips, and pamphlets, in multiple languages.179 The assistant director of the FBI’s
counterterrorism division at the time, Michael Steinbach, concluded in 2015 the Islamic
State, "… now has direct access into the United States like never before."180
This continuous information operation of the Islamic State generated a systematic
effect on individuals throughout the world. As Mark Lowenthal, an expert on intelligence
and national security, stated propaganda is, “used to support individuals or groups
friendly to one’s own side or to undermine one’s opponents.”181 The intent of the Islamic
States employment of social media is to rally support from outsiders and undermine the
West and apostate regimes. The use of information operations has shown success. It is
estimated that around 30,000 foreigners, not from Syria or Iraq, have joined the Islamic
State. This number includes roughly 3,400 fighters from Western countries.182 Out of that
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3,400 from western countries, around 200 have been from the U.S. The realization of the
extent of the Islamic State’s information operations campaign calls for the U.S. to
institute its own information operations as a primary campaign. The Islamic State has
been allowed to recruit and promote its agenda while at the same time to ridicule, and
undermine the U.S.

Current U.S. Methods Against The Islamic State
Similar to Operations Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. has not prioritized information
operations to combat the Islamic State. Instead, the U.S. continues to implement
conventional warfare operations, mainly in the form of air strikes and capture-kill
missions by special operations forces. The U.S. is currently leading a coalition that is
conducting a major airstrike campaign against the Islamic State. As of February 7, 2017,
U.S. coalition forces had led over 18,185 air strikes at a cost of $10.9 billion.183 The air
strikes are focused on confirmed Islamic State targets in an attempt to disrupt, degrade,
and defeat the Islamic State.184
Additionally, the U.S. has sent many advisors and special operations into the
surrounding region in an effort to train opposition forces. The U.S. trained force has
relied on volunteer efforts from those inside the Islamic State controlled territory and
surrounding area. According to the Pentagon, the U.S.’s goal in recruits was to be 5,000
by the end of 2015.185 However, that goal was not reached. As a New York Times article
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shows, “Defense officials said that only 100 to 120 Syrian fighters were in training right
now.”186 Furthermore, the fighters that were willing to be trained did not fight against the
Islamic State afterward. Some estimates show as little as 4 or 5 U.S. trained fighters have
stayed in to battle the Islamic State, at the expense of the tens of millions of dollars the
U.S. spent funding the training program.
The Obama administration was optimistic, as stated in a Pentagon statement on
July 6th, 2015, on how recruiting local militias in the area would be effective in time.187
President Obama stated that patience is key for more recruits to join the cause and that
these methods were a long-term strategy against the Islamic State. However, training a
militia does not ensure progress on the psychological battlefield, which is where the
Islamic State is largely active. Continuing to ignore these issues could hinder recruiting
willing and able fighters against the Islamic State, and could ultimately create strategic
consequences.
As stated before, understanding what the Islamic State is and how it conducts
itself is essential to appreciate the effect such a strategy has on those who are susceptible
to its message. Foreign fighters migrate from all corners of the planet, meaning the
Islamic State is reaching individuals from multiple culture and backgrounds. The next
chapter discusses how foreign fighters become radicalized and what drives radical
individuals towards the decision to travel to support the Islamic State or produce violence
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outside the Islamic State’s boundaries.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THE RADICALIZATION
PROCESS

“To fit in with the change of events, words, too had to change their usual meanings. What
used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage
one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely
another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to
disguise one’s unmanly character; ability to understand a question from all sides meant
that one was totally unfitted for action. Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real
man…” ~ Thucydides (5th century B.C.)188

The principle strategy for the U.S. against the Islamic State has been to degrade
and destroy the Islamic State’s control over territory through the use of force.189 The
current objective of the U.S. towards the foreign fighter recruitment dilemma is to
delegitimize the Islamic State by taking back Islamic State occupied territory, making the
caliphate less attractive to individuals susceptible to being persuaded by the Islamic
State’s propaganda. This would kill the issue at the source and the Islamic State would
lose support. Support or compliance with the Islamic State is how the caliphate has
managed to hold wealth and territory.
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The financial, territorial, or strategic assistance from outside the Islamic States
occupied territory is essential for the caliphate to be destroyed. Furthermore, discrediting
the organization would create difficulty for the Islamic State to control territory as well as
a population. Delegitimizing the Islamic State has been considered by U.S. leadership as
a priority, however, the U.S. has not engaged the psychological aspects to successfully
delegitimize the caliphate. Delegitimizing an organization requires a full spectrum
utilization of psychological, sociological, and political strategies and tools. Yet, U.S.
psychological strategies such as strategic communication and information operations
have been neglected throughout this operation.190 Instead, the radical ideology driving
individuals to commit terrorism has prospered. As one FBI document in 2011stated,
“Modern Islamist extremism emerged in the middle of the last century, but, in its
beginnings, was limited to the Middle East. That dramatically changed in the aftermath of
the assault on 9/11 when the threat Islamist terrorism posed to countries in the Western
world became apparent.”191 Radicalized individuals now have a global reach to
proliferate disorder. This in nature is a psychological issue that conventional military
operations alone cannot defeat. Because of this, future U.S. policy must strongly consider
proactive and successful policies that engage the psychological aspects of this conflict.
The Islamic State’s strategy has shown much progress in radicalizing and
mobilizing foreign fighters. According to estimates, the Islamic State, at its peak, had
nearly 40,000 foreign fighters join in the defense of the caliphate from all corners of the
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globe.192 The significance of this, as explained in a lecture with Dr. Sebastian Gorka, is
that the number of foreign fighters supporting the Islamic State is around two-thirds of
the foreign fighters joined the mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the entire SovietAfghan war.193 Furthermore, not only has the Islamic State managed to recruit and
mobilize a large volume of foreign support but has recruited such an amount in only two
years.
Moreover, fighters have become motivated to join the Islamic State from all
corners of the planet - from Tunisia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Belgium, Australia, and
Denmark.194 Even in the U.S., there have been nearly 250 individuals who were
motivated to join the Islamic State. This signifies the Islamic State is not nearly an
isolated problem over there but is a global issue with global consequences. The Islamic
State is reaching individuals on a personal level and radicalizing them to the point where
it would be worth giving up a life to join in a cause that many were not born into. This
suggests that the conflict is not merely regional, ethnic, and religious, but psychological.
It is the psychology of individuals that are targeted by the Islamic State, therefore, it is
the hearts and minds of individuals that the U.S. must focus efforts.
As an FBI document on the radicalization process articulated, the U.S. is only
beginning to study the radicalization phenomenon. As the article states, “… more art than
science. Radicalization, especially of Islamist extremists, only recently has become a
serious research topic of law enforcement organizations, intelligence agencies, and
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academia. Yet, data still are not extensive and have resulted mainly from shared analysis
of executed or prevented terrorist attacks.”195 Although winning the hearts and minds is
not an exact science, and any true psychological strategy cannot be accomplished with
insubstantial understanding of the psychology pertaining to the conflict.
The process for an individual progressing from frustration with a political issue to
deciding to commit violence is imprecise. As Lisa Curtis, an expert on terrorism and the
middle east explains, “There is no single explanation for what drives a person to embrace
extremism, as the process is driven by a complex mix of triggering events and personal
and environmental factors. Former CIA case officer Patrick Skinner maintains that those
fighting for ISIS can be subdivided into three main categories: ‘the Psychopaths, the
Pious, and the Pragmatists.”196 This thesis focuses on the individuals who do not suffer
from psychological disorders as psychopathy, sociopathy, schizophrenia, or other
disorders that influence an individual into committing violent acts without an allegiance
to the Islamic State but justify violence in the organization’s stead. Once psychological
outliers are eliminated, there are three main themes that compel an individual into
radicalization process: religious motivation, disenfranchisement, and the wanting to be a
part of something greater than oneself. These three themes encapsulate the inspiration for
the majority of the foreign fighters that are coursing into the Islamic States occupied
territory.
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Religion
Religion is one of the single greatest factors in the conflict against both the
Islamic State and the foreign fighter recruitment. Religion is a primary identifier for
individuals, especially in the Arab and Muslim world.197 As previous stated, much of the
Islamic State’s rhetoric is contrived from the Salafists religion. Although the Islamic
State is not representative of the Salafist sect of Sunni Islam, the organization utilizes
religious doctrine effectively. Much of the language established by the Islamic State is
designed to not only connect with extremist Salafi groups, but Sunnis whom do not have
a fundamentalist view of Islam, and persuade those persons to flee the apostate regimes
and join the true caliphate.
Religion is a core factor in this conflict, and, as with any cultural conflict, it
partitions communities as well as populations abroad. As Ryan Hunter and Daniel Heinke
with the FBI state, “The idea of ‘us’—the ummah (community) or ummah al-mu’min in
(the community of the believers)—defending against ‘them’—the nonbelievers
conducting an alleged war against Islam—secures a strong bond among the followers
while alienating them from Western citizens.”198 Cultural triggers can supersede
international norms, such as peaceful diplomacy, especially to those who do not identify
with a nationally or agree with international arrangements as many Arabs do. Arabs view
statehood through a religious lens, as previously discussed. The consequence of this
perceptual lens is the Middle East does not generally separate church and state matters
but considers them one in the same.199 This framing of the situation also can put
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individuals in positions where they may feel obligated to carry out certain religious
duties, such as jihad.200 As stated before, the Islamic State’s rhetoric is aimed at Sunni
Islam and promotes the idea that it is the responsibility of all Sunnis to join in this holy
cause.
An example of the extent that the Islamic State’s promotes its image based on of
religious doctrine to motivate those of the “Ummah” to enlist in its objective emanates
from the name of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself. As previously stated in chapter three,
Baghdadi was born Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri in Samarra in 1971.201 However,
Badri changed his name to Baghdadi because of the significance holds with Sunni Islam.
Abu Bakr was the father-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad and was the first caliph, in the
eyes of the Sunni’s, after the death of the Prophet Mohammad.202 By changing his name
to Baghdadi, Badri conveyed to the Sunni Muslims that he is a legitimate Caliph of a new
caliphate and the rightful leader of Sunni Muslims. As Sebastian Gorka stated regarding
this, “it would be as if someone changed their name to George Washington in the United
States”, Americans would grasp the significance of the gesture.”203 All aspects of the
Islamic State are saturated with religious doctrine and metaphors.
Furthermore, religion remains one of the largest reasons for individuals to travel
to the Islamic State. As noted in a DOD document, “About 20% of the homegrown
terrorists examined in one study had a spiritual mentor, a more experienced Muslim who
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gave specific instructions and direction during the radicalization process. Such a mentor
might be associated with a mosque or be accessed via the Internet. The mentor keeps the
radicalization process on track. About a quarter of the terrorists in one study had a
perceived religious authority who provided specific theological approval for their violent
activity.”204 Through religious messages and verses, recruiters for the Islamic State are
able to motivate individuals in fulfilling the organization’s agenda. Understanding, and
promoting counternarratives to these verses would benefit the U.S. against the Islamic
State’s religious propaganda. By overlooking weaponized religious ideology, the U.S. is
limiting itself in establishing an efficacious psychological campaign towards preventing
or deter individuals from migrating to the Islamic State occupied territory or striking in
their homeland based on religious influences.

Disenfranchisement
Beyond the religious demeanors exists the alienation of Arabs and Muslims
outside the Middle East. Lack of assimilation between cultures has been an ongoing
issue, primarily in Europe and Eurasia, but the United States increasingly has been
following the same trend. The estrangement stems from a culture clash as individuals
from the Arab and Muslim regions immigrate into a non-Muslim territory. To preserve
the culture of the host country, in areas such as Europe and Russia is the host
governments have legislated laws and procedures to keep said country’s culture unaltered
as the migrant population arrives. Examples of this include the “burqa bans” that have
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been happening throughout Europe.205 From France and Germany to Belgium and
Denmark, the burqa has been made illegal in many parts of those countries for a variety
of reasons.
Whether the ban is for the benefit of the Muslim equality in the area or to preserve
European customs is irrelevant, but the impact those bans have affected Muslim culture
negatively inside those countries. These bans leave the minority Muslim community
feeling ostracized in their new environment. As well, many individuals who wore such
garments may not be new immigrants, but second or third generation immigrants. The
negative effects for those born in the host country, identify with their nationality of the
host country, and then secluded for beliefs may provoke fanatic reactions through such
actions.
The vulnerability to becoming radicalized is exacerbated when one considers the
segregation in the same countries. Many areas in France, such as the Paris slum projects
les Banlieues, have created secluded communities in the country, marginalizing Muslim
individuals further. As Philip Rucker with the Washington Post discussed in an article
examining Islamic communities inside France, “Crime is high. Work is scarce, and young
people who can't find it linger on the streets.”206 The environment stresses young
Muslims, having no outlet to focus the resentment and anger. The result is a frustrated
individual susceptible to the manipulation of an Islamic State recruiter.
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Furthermore, as senior associate with the Atlantic magazine, Heather Horn,
discussed regarding a recent survey conducted concerning racism in Eastern Europe and
Western Europe,
According to the 2005-09 World Values Survey, 14 percent of Poles and
24 percent of Hungarians would not want an immigrant or foreign worker as a
neighbor. In France, however, the figure stands at an extraordinary 36.5 percent.
The most recent World Values Survey, conducted between 2010 and 2014, did
not poll Hungary or France. But it showed that the proportion of Germans
objecting to a foreign neighbor (21 percent) matched that in Romania (21 percent)
— and was three times higher than in Poland (7 percent) … Twenty-seven percent
of Britons and a full 69 percent of Italians had a negative view of Muslims, while
30 percent of Germans disliked Turks. Western Europeans, in other words, may
appear more tolerant when talking in the abstract, but are as intolerant as Eastern
Europeans when it comes to attitudes toward specific groups. The “cultural gap”
may just be that Western Europeans are more polished in the language of
tolerance, while in reality being equally intolerant.207
As the racism is still considerable throughout Europe, the radicalization through
disenfranchisement could lead to more problems long-term. Racism may contribute
further to terrorist attacks as the massive refugee migration into Europe, along with the
demographics in both Europe and Russia suggesting a population boom for Muslim
citizens and a population decline for traditional European/Eurasian nationalities.208
Sectarian tensions may be further exasperated when factoring in groups such as the
Islamic State’s unchallenged dialogue about the evil West and trying to show the strength
of Islam.
Studies on the radicalization process suggest, “… that the quest for significance is
aroused under three conditions: perceived significance loss (humiliation suffered by self
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or by one’s group, dealing a blow to one’s social identity); perceived threat of
significance loss should one shirk the demanded mission…”209 Perceived alienation and
humiliation from the West leads to resentment and further conflict. As research from the
FBI shows these factors result in,
Discontent seems to serve as the prerequisite of the radicalization process… This
discontent may be based on individuals’ actual experiences or those of other
people within their community, or it may result from the normal process of
identity formation among young people. These latter feelings of uncertainty of
oneself during adolescence and early adulthood are common and well-known in
developmental psychology, but after individuals feel rejected by society, these
emotions can lead to a deep identity crisis and cause one to search for a new
purpose of life. Some Muslim-born individuals may link experiences of
disadvantage or nonbelonging to their faith and judge them to be an expression of
cultural and religious discrimination.210
As will be further explored in the recommendations chapter, to effectively combat radical
extremism, societies in Europe and the United States will need to readdress certain
cultural traits that may be hindering cohabitation and assimilation, as well as diplomacy
with Islamic communities abroad.

Greater Than Oneself
A third component of the radicalization process centers on particular difficulties
the current U.S. generation specifically is struggling with, which may lead to the
generation being susceptible to the Islamic State’s propaganda. The vulnerability the
generation is facing stems from the desire for the pursuit of importance and the desire to
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be a part of something historic. Research conducted by the Department of Defense on the
radicalization process argues,
A violent act may be seen as a way to succeed at something that makes a
difference. The absolutist, "black and white" nature of most extremist ideologies
is often attractive to those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of
navigating a complicated world. Without struggling to define oneself or discern
personal meaning, an individual may choose to define his or her identity simply
through identification with a cause or membership in a group … Many
prospective terrorists find in a radical extremist group not only a sense of
meaning, but also a sense of belonging, connectedness, and affiliation. One
researcher argues that ‘for the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial
attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an
abstract ideology or to violence.211
This may be especially true of the new “Millennial” generation in the U.S., who are
constantly seeking a grander purpose. As Karl Moore, a writer on leadership for Forbes
magazine states Millennials are, “… constantly seeking purpose in what they do for a
living… money is important and they do enjoy making it, however, they long to be part
of something bigger than themselves.”212
The analysis about the current U.S. generation suggests the quest for greatness
many young and impressionable Muslims, or even non-Muslims, are seeking could be
found in the Islamic State. The quest to be a part of a larger movement may have been a
contributing factor to the Boston bombings in April of 2013. The bombers, Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, had no clear ties to the Islamic State or terrorism, yet
were radicalized through the organization's information operations.213 The brothers
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managed to become radical and trained through the Internet and managed to evade
suspicion throughout the planning process of the attack. The significance of this attack is
that as the Islamic State enables radical behavior through its information operations, the
more likely attacks will continue.
The even greater significance behind this is that the Millennial generation was
also born and raised in an environment where the U.S. and the Middle East were in
constant conflict.214 This could create even further divide among cultures and give the
Islamic State more room to operate in the psychological domain. When considering these
factors, along with the global reach through the Internet, the need for the U.S. to invest in
a psychological strategy has never been more necessary. The Islamic State has been using
this cultural rift as a recruiting tool to pull those willing to listen into further
estrangement from the West. As stated in a 2016 publication by the Heritage Foundation,
“ISIS’s unprecedented success in recruiting fighters from around the world is largely due
to its ability to convince impressionable young Muslims of a civilizational struggle
between Islam and the West, making it the duty of all Muslims to join the war.”215
Beyond the Millennial generation in the U.S. the pursuit to join a higher cause is
still relevant in the international arena. So much so, that many in the policymaking
community cannot accurately distinguish between motives, such as religion being the
driving behind radicalization, or if religion is a farce masking another motive. Agencies

214

Christopher Jusuf, “Millennials and the war of our time." The Hill. February 04, 2016. Accessed
February 12, 2017. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/263296-millennials-and-thewar-of-our-time. As Christopher Jusuf states, “The Global War on Terror now stretches into the majority
of the lifespans of anyone under 30 years old without a foreseeable end in sight. Hypothetically, a child
born after 9/11 will be eligible to be sent to Afghanistan in just 4 years. Make no mistake about it; the
struggle against radical Islamic extremism is the war of our time”
215
Curtis, "Combatting the ISIS Foreign Fighter Pipeline: A Global Approach."

76

and organizations having managed to question foreign fighters as to their reasoning
behind supporting the Islamic State have received unclear justifications. As one
publishing from the Brookings Institute demonstrates, “Overall, security officials believe
that the decision to go fight in a foreign conflict is usually less an act of religious
commitment than of young male rebellion and thirst for adventure [greatness]. One
intelligence official notes that many recruits ‘just want to fight in Syria’ but are vague on
why.”216 Although religion plays a significant role in radicalizing foreign fighters, the
Islamic State’s ability to motivate individuals beyond religious reasons suggests future
U.S. policies and strategies ought to involve counter methods for those seeking purpose
as well.

Mobilizations And The Islamic State’s Pipeline
Although once an individual chooses to join a terrorist organization such as the
Islamic State the individual is radical and dangerous, further radicalization and the true
strategic danger emerges once these radical dissenters arrive in the Islamic State’s
territory. Once under the Islamic State’s authority, the new recruits are molded through
psychological and physical training into the Islamic State’s ideal soldier. Recent findings
in Mosul have discovered training facilities oriented towards shaping an individual’s
behavior. Training manuals centered on guerrilla warfare tactics along with religion
doctrines supporting the Islamic State’s perception have been found at Islamic State
training facilities in both Arabic and Russian, which are the most commonly spoken
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languages among those who migrate into the Islamic State.217 Terrorist training camps
are not unique to the Islamic State, but the significance is in how successful the camps
are at indoctrinating and training fighters. Just as the mujahedeen training and radicalized
individuals that created Al Qaeda, and Al Qaeda training recruits that now fight for the
Islamic State, the continuous pattern suggests the current recruits in the Islamic State’s
influence will become the new terrorist group after the Islamic State.218 The point of
reaching those vulnerable to joining the Islamic State before they enter the training phase
is crucial because once recruits enter the pipeline, there is a significantly lower chance of
deradicalizing those individuals.
The evidence behind this claim stems from the characteristics of the radicalization
process that have been previously described. The religious aspect, the
disenfranchisement, and the seeking a greater purpose are all answered once the
individual enters the Islamic State’s training. As Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro from
the Brookings Institute demonstrate, “Training camps give recruits a sense of mission and
focus, helping them develop an esprit de corps.”219 Once the recruit enters the pipeline,
the answers he or she seeks are found. This creates a solid bond between the training the
recruits have received, along with a sense of fulfillment. Connecting with potential
foreign fighters before they mobilize is a decisive factor in the war on future terrorism.
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Beyond the training phase, foreign fighters become indoctrinated to the Islamic
State’s ambitions, and it becomes exponentially difficult to reverse the process. As well,
by that time the fighter is actively participating in the Islamic State’s war, and therefore,
the issue of preventing the fighter from being radicalized becomes extraneous. As Daniel
Byman explains again, “Many foreign fighters who go to a war zone are young and
ideologically unformed, and the combatant groups see converting them to their
worldview as part of their mission: training camps emphasize teaching ‘true’ Islam and
the duty of jihad as well as weapons training. Individuals may enter the war with no
intention of attacking at home, but their views change and come to encompass a broader
set of goals. As one official succinctly put it, ‘They come back fucked up.”220 The veteran
fighters return to a sedentary lifestyle desiring the same sense of purpose and satisfaction
they had with the terrorist organization and become the catalyst for the next war.

Veteran Foreign Fighters Returning Home
A foreign policy strategy regarding the foreign fighter dilemma in many ways is
less germane once a foreign fighter reaches the training centers of a terrorist organization,
but reemerges once the conflict is over by the undertakings of the now veteran foreign
fighter. A portion of the fighters move to another conflict, such as Chechnya, or may
decide to return to their home countries. The scattering of veteran fighters poses a variety
of problems for the host countries of those individuals because the possibility of the
veteran fighter beginning the recruitment process over again. Additionally, often the
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original problems that radicalized the fighter in the first place are still there, leaving the
veteran fighter with opportunities to recruit. As well, the now battle-hardened foreign
fighter has the motivation and the knowledge on how to go about establishing a new
organization. As explained again by Daniel Byman,
… the fighters return to their home countries in the West and keep the
circle turning. Returned foreign fighters have gained in status—obtained a sort of
‘street cred’—that makes them able to recruit and radicalize others. Sympathizers
admired returnees from Iraq and Afghanistan, giving them the prestige to
convince others to enter the fray. In the final step, the returned fighters begin to
plot terrorist attacks in their homeland. Slowly, they turn their attention away
from the foreign struggle that took them abroad and begin to focus on perceived
injustices at home: insults against Islam from their country’s politicians and
opinion leaders, support for the forces oppressing Muslims abroad, or the daily
prejudices faced by Muslims in America and especially Europe.221
Foreign fighters returning home pose a strategic threat as they arm and motivate a new
generation of terrorists. As well, fighters may establish new terrorist cells within Europe
or the United States. Furthermore, as foreign fighters are not only experienced in combat
but often end the war with a well-established network along with fellow veteran foreign
fighters, financing and resources available to the veteran foreign fighter are plentiful.
Much like cancer reaching the bloodstream and infecting the rest of the body, veteran
foreign fighters spreading outside the conflict zone after the Islamic State is defeated
could have a global impact.

Lone-Wolf Attacks
Although lone-wolf attacks are distinct from foreign fighters, both are subject to
radicalization triggered by the Islamic State. Therefore, lone wolves should be considered
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as part of the problem to effectively understand how information operations can be
beneficial to the U.S. For this section, a lone-wolf attack only regards those who have
been radicalized by the Islamic State. The distinction is important, especially in the
United States, where there has been a rise in lone-wolf attacks that are racially or
politically motivated, as well as a result of a mental illness.222 However, even when
considering outliers, attacks from radical Islamist groups have been on the rise steadily.
These attacks originated in popularity with Al Qaeda in the late 1990s, and the number of
attacks has more than doubled since 2010, going from just eight in the 2000s to 20 in
2016.223 Additionally, not only are the number of attacks increasing, but also are
becoming deadlier overall. This could mean that the method is considered effective by
the Islamic State and its sympathizers, and therefore, create a greater emerging threat.
Returning foreign fighters may create inspiration throughout their community to
perform attacks. As Ryan Hunter and Daniel Heinke research with the FBI’s
counterterrorism division reason, “In the majority of cases, extremists become radicalized
in large part through intensifying social interaction with other people with shared beliefs.
Such a relationship then results in a mutual push toward violence. Sometimes, a spiritual
leader will goad individuals to take such actions. The ‘lone wolf/lone offender’ has
served as the rare exception. However, in recent years, prominent attacks in the United
States and Europe were carried out successfully by individuals with few ties to other
extremists, highlighting the threat posed by radicalized persons who are relatively
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alone.”224 The credibility veteran fighters receive amongst the community they inhabit
allow for individuals to idolize and conform to extremist perceptions.
Developing a comprehensive strategy towards combating the lone-wolf dilemma
is as complex as understanding it. Although nearly 40% of lone-wolf attacks are carried
out by those with mental illness, the threat posed by those radicalized or supporters of the
Islamic State’s cause establishes the need to discredit radical behavior.225 Individuals are
radicalized through a range of information operations tactics inciting individuals to a
tipping point. Understanding the psychology of the tipping point, and developing
psychological methods to curb this behavior will be necessary as these attacks continue to
happen.

Conclusion
Understanding the radicalization process for foreign fighters is essential to
realizing the U.S. lacks a psychological component in its strategy to combat both the
foreign fighter issue and the Islamic State. Information operations and strategic
communication must play a vital role in any strategy to:
a. Effectively combat the Islamic State’s own information operations campaign
that is currently successful in radicalizing individuals, both in its occupied
territory and abroad; and,
b. Further prevent the next generation of Islamist terrorist groups that will just
begin the cycle over again.
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Although radicalized individuals may not pose the most severe threat currently to the
United States or its allies from a conventional standpoint, the festering of this issue will
continue to increase as it has, along with the continuation of interconnectivity among
nations, leading to long-term generational conflicts if not handled properly. Strategically,
the Islamic State and the foreign fighter issue create a destabilization in the international
arena and disunity among nations. The next chapter proposes insights and
recommendations that best utilize information operations to create an effective
psychological strategy towards both the Islamic State and potentially radicalized
individuals.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS

“…perceptions are just as important as reality.” ~ Michael Waller226

Information operations would strategically benefit the U.S. against adversaries
such as foreign fighters and the Islamic State. The use of IO must be full spectrum,
employing all dynamics of IO discussed in chapter one. From using strategic
communications to push the U.S. message, to electric and cyber warfare, to covert action
on multiple fronts and inside terrorist controlled territory as well as economic action,
straining the Islamic State’s ability to obtain money, all instruments of psychological
warfare must be used. An information operations campaign allows the U.S. to control the
information in the region, awarding the U.S. to the psychological initiative. Additionally,
integrating IO into the core of a strategy would have a positive effect with domestic lonewolf attacks. Alleviating radicalization abroad creates less propaganda and anti-Western
ideology, leading to less influence on the Internet, creating fewer chances for individuals
to develop a radicalized behavior. Psychological strategies require years of constant
implementation for success. IO is not a tactical solution, but a grand strategy for the
global war on terror. Although, it is easier to continue capture-kill missions and airstrikes,
however, this does not address the root of the problem of radicalization, nor solve it.
The quote by Michael Waller from the beginning of this chapter demonstrates that
how societies interpret U.S. strategies are as significant as the intentions of the U.S.
Therefore, it is as important for the U.S. to generate an environment in which populations
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understand information in perspectives that best support U.S. strategic objectives. Simply
put, being right is not what matters, but being perceived as right is equally important.
Delegitimizing the Islamic State, curbing radical behavior, and promoting the U.S.
agenda in a successful manner all must be derived from a psychological standpoint.
When considering how information operations can successfully be applied, it is
best to view IO as the lens which all forms of U.S. defense tools and communications are
funneled through. All aspects of how the U.S. conducts itself and connects with potential
Islamic State supporters and beyond are channeled through a psychological strategy.
Using IO as the process to which strategy is considered fuses all U.S. operations
regarding the Islamic State and foreign fighters towards a single objective in this conflict.
Conventional tactics, such as airstrikes or troop deployment are still relevant, but through
the lens of IO only. Airstrikes and capture-kill missions, or full-scale ground deployments
must be done with the planning and training that assists the psychological strategy. This
eliminates any possibility of another blowback from the targeted population.
However, before an effective strategy can be devised, it is this author's belief that
certain issues must be addressed and rectified domestically first. Many of the
recommendations of this thesis are focused on fundamental bureaucratic and cultural
changes that must be made for IO to thrive. The U.S. does not currently have a culture
that nurtures psychological strategies as will be discussed in the next section. Therefore,
in addition to U.S. policy makers prioritizing information operations, bureaucratic
modifications must be made as well.
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Synchronizing The Department Of State And The Department Of Defense
As fundamental as it may appear, information operations and strategic
communications have vastly different definitions depending on the agency or
organization. Michael Waller, who is seen as a subject matter expert on strategic
communications, has stated on the issue, “Like any art form, a real definition of public
diplomacy is subjective, and can be the source of lively and often bitter debates.”227
Although discussing public diplomacy, specifically, the concept is similar with all aspects
of information operations and strategic communications. However, information
operations and strategic communications conduct similar strategic psychological
processes, therefore, should be considered as part of the same issue instead of separate
systems. Therefore, a unifying definition is necessary for psychological strategies.
Michael Waller has consistently suggested the term “psychological strategy,”
which he defines as, “…the comprehensive orchestration of the implied and explicit
information associated with and the use of the national elements of power (diplomatic,
economic, and military) so that coherent, consistent messages, meanings and themes are
conveyed in ways that shape and influence understanding of and support for U.S. beliefs,
values, and national security policies.”228 A definition such as Michael Waller’s
encompasses the full spectrum of information operations, military operations, and
strategic communications and focuses all applications regarding an issue in a single
objective. A psychological strategy is a grand strategy towards radicalized behavior
regarding the Islamic State and terrorism.
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Establishing a more robust definition leads to the inevitable admission for a
stronger nexus between the Department of State and the Department of Defense, the
government’s two largest suppliers of information operations and strategic
communications. Much of the dysfunction in information operatives is based in the
contemporary bureaucratic environment not only lacking espousal towards IO, but also a
consistent miscommunication or setback through the U.S. diplomatic side or through the
national defense branch of the United States government.229 The divide between U.S.
agencies produces a situation where both departments attempt to push its single sided
agendas and policies, which may clash with other departments. The result is conflicting
messages or a lack of a message from the U.S. abroad. Therefore, a psychological
strategy requires the U.S. to better coordinate departments to create a more fluid
environment.
To provide context on the significance of synergy between departments is the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act modified multiple
deficiencies within the DOD, one outstanding section of the legislation was aimed, “to
improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of
military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department
of Defense, and for other purposes.”230 The result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was
stronger harmonization between military branches in joint operations. This outcome was
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more effective and successful U.S. military operations.231 As the Goldwater-Nichols Act
created stronger collaboration among military branches, a similar action between the
DOS and DOD is required. Collaboration could be managed in a variety of ways, such as
creating new legislation merging the DOS and DOD in top priority fields, such as
information operations. Although successful legislation is a considerable feat to
accomplish, especially in the contemporary political environment, the result would allow
more cooperation between the two departments. However, legislation requires a
considerable amount of time to pass, approve, and fund as well as time for department
cultural to assimilate. The longevity of legislating allows more time for the foreign
fighter dilemma to rankle.
Another approach would be to establish a nexus organization between the DOD
and DOS that oversees and coordinates information operations and strategic
communications among the departments to ensure cooperation. The nexus would likely
be a joint organization with the purpose of coordinating and executing information
operations and strategic communications in the most efficient manner. Similar challenges
as merging the DOD and DOS would also be for this nexus organization, as well as the
nexus organization having the ability to enforce policies properly using DOS and DOD
resources. This would be amplified as the contemporary political climate calls restrained
funding and political challenges. As well, a nexus organization would require
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congressional approval to establish, which has the same hindrances as merging aspects of
the DOS and DOD altogether.
The merging of key dynamics within the DOS and DOD for a psychological
strategy, while necessary, may prove inadequate due to the deliberately slow moving
nature of the U.S. government in the seemingly fast pace environment in which
radicalization lives. Democracy as a principle is a slow process, as it should be, to remain
steady and considerate. However, the conundrum of the necessity for an adaptable
strategy versus a democracy’s need for stability creates a paradox for a successful
psychological strategy. Therefore, the solution for the U.S. enactment of a psychological
strategy may lie in the privatization of it, where constraints are fewer and adaptation is
necessary for success.

Privatize Full Spectrum Information Operations
A second consideration extends beyond government’s participation in the
psychological strategy. Although the U.S. government conducting its own IO and
strategic communications will always necessary, there are also many hindrances that
come with the U.S. being the sole conductor of IO on behalf of itself. Therefore,
privatizing a psychological strategy could benefit the U.S. in this matter. As of now, the
private sector provides support only for any such operation, but do not conduct
independent operations for the U.S.232 However, a private organization would be more
efficient and effective if it were to conduct all varieties of information operations that
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were defined in chapter one. A private company could better ensure operations evolved
and adapted to the pace of the contemporary environment.
A private company would be superior in conducting information operations for
three primary reasons: current budgetary constraints hinder progress; along with the slow
and inflexible budget process; too much oversight and politics create an ineffective
situation where proper information operations are ignored or gridlocked. As seen in
chapter two, the U.S. is its own worst enemy with regards to a psychological strategy.
Therefore, as the need for information operations is considerable in the effort against the
Islamic State, the foreign fighter threat, and the national security regarding lone-wolf
attacks, the most beneficial consideration would be for the private sector to take over IO.
The budgetary constraints the U.S. federal government are limited along with the
tendency for the U.S. to deprioritize information operations create an environment where
information operations cannot flourish. Moreover, the U.S. handling its own information
operations obstructs the operation due to inflexible and often resources purchased from a
lowest bidder approach.233 These factors hinder such information operations as
propaganda videos, which has been seen with the State department abysmal attempt at
creating an anti-Islamic State clip.234
In addition to budgetary constraints is the budgetary process itself. The budget
process through Congress requires nearly a full year to be completed if conducted
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efficiently, which it rarely is.235 When legislation cannot be agreed upon, the budget is
suspended with continuing resolutions until a compromise can be met. Continuing
resolutions create turmoil for strategies such as IO leading to agencies not keeping pace
with an adversary that does not have such restraints. The result is a frail and irrelevant
operation and strategy, which is ignored by a target audience and less support from
policymakers.
U.S. computer network operations and cyber security in the rapid change in the
cyber domain reflect the concerns of the U.S. ability to modernize efficiently. With a
yearlong budget process, as well a budget hindrances and purchasing inadequate
technology, the result is that U.S. cybersecurity being slow and unable to successful
conduct its mission.236 The outcome is that U.S. national cybersecurity vulnerable to
attack. However, it has been suggested that the solution to U.S. cybersecurity is for the
U.S. to delegate that national security priority to private industries who are unrestrained
by U.S. bureaucracy.237 The result would be more flexibility to keep pace with the
constantly changing cyber environment, as well as a more capable pool of employees
wishing to serve their country, but don’t want a low federal salary.238 The result may be
overall better U.S. cybersecurity.
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For the same reasons, privatizing U.S. information operations and strategic
communications could benefit U.S. strategy. Information operations planning requires
both the ability to react quickly to an opponent operation and proactively conduct a U.S.
information operations. As well a private company such as Booz Allen Hamilton or
Lockheed Martin can more effectively bring in quality personnel and resources needed to
create effective information operations. This ensures any operation is done with the
highest quantity of messages sent in the highest quality possible, and avoiding another
“ISIS land” fiasco from the State Department.
Additionally, just as covert operations have been continuously moving to special
operations because of too much government oversight, as stated in chapter one, similar
oversight hindrances also restrain Joint Special Operations Command from fully
implementing covert operations. Oversight issues, such as not conducting operations due
to the political ramifications obstruct a strategy’s chance for success. Therefore, allowing
private industry the ability to conduct covert action independently, while would still
require a level of oversight, could be beneficial for the U.S. because of the clandestine
nature of information operations.
As well as the oversight, private organizations have the ability to withhold factors
that the U.S. cannot avoid. A private company does not have to release financial records,
for example.239 Also, as the primary mission for covert operations would be extensive
overseas living in hostile areas, as well as the risk of being captured or killed, it would be
more productive for a strategy if the individual were not affiliated with the U.S.
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government. Ensuring that any operative overseas be done in a covert manner mitigates
blowback, such as the Islamic State killing Americans, which may rally support from
foreign fighters. This is most effective by private contracting companies that conduct
operations the U.S. government does officially acknowledge.
However, as stated this recommendation does not deny the need for oversight. To
privatize IO and mitigate potential corruption or misuse, there would need to be a level
oversight done to uphold both quality of products, and confirm the company is following
U.S. ethical and legal obligations. Such oversight would likely need to be made by the
NSC, along with certain Congressional oversight to ensure checks and balances between
government branches. The recommendation for Congressional oversight would include
the “gang of eight”, who are informed of presidential findings.240 This ensures that any
private organization acts in accordance with U.S. law and abides by U.S. policy.

The Message To Send
In addition to the bureaucratic and domestic cultural issues that need to be
resolved at domestically for a psychological strategy to be a success, begs the question:
what would an information operation look like? This next section attempts to establish an
example of how the U.S. uses information to influence an environment so individuals
vulnerable to join the Islamic State or commit terror attacks are prevented from doing so.
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The primary objective of an operation directed at the Islamic State is to both delegitimize
the Islamic State and the terrorist tool as well.
First, before successful proactive information operations can be designed to defeat
the Islamic State, or prevent factions or individuals from using the terrorism tactic, the
U.S.’s primary objective must be repairing its credibility from the global war on terror.
As shown in chapter two, this U.S. unsuccessfully implemented IO or strategic
communications, and the result was the further escalation of the conflict. Therefore, the
operation described will not be necessarily to end the conflict but to shape the
environment to provide an opportunity in which a solution can be found. As the war of
ideas is a generational conflict, a final solution may not be realized in the near future, yet
the U.S. must begin sooner rather than later as the more the U.S. denies this issue, the
worse the conflict may become.
A successful operation needs to begin with operational security (OPSEC).
Information operations are clandestine and covert in nature, and therefore, it is imperative
that the U.S. conducts itself with discretion. Utilizing OPSEC to conceal what must be
concealed, and public affairs to publicize what should be publicized is the beginning of
the U.S. controlling information abroad. Beyond this, as this conflict is largely based on
cultural disputes and religious ideology, the U.S. must begin to understand both the
strategic culture and the ideology of the Islamic State to establish a sound strategy. This
is best done through intelligence collection.
For this thesis, one sample of useful intelligence allocates cultural aspects of
many inside the Islamic State’s occupied territory and surrounding areas, which is that
many in the Arab culture find the U.S. to be heathens and evil. Not only because of how
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the U.S. comes off in the press but from entertainment media which is widely popular
both inside the Middle East and globally.241 However, despite the popularity of U.S.
entertainment there is a strong clash of culture in much of U.S. movies and music, such
as excessive drinking and partying, violence, and promiscuity (especially among
women).242 This has led to a cultural backlash.
A method to mitigate this cultural resentment is through the use of covert action,
CIA resources, SOF, and through the use of computer network operations to cut off
certain Internet sites and transmissions as well as preventing the trafficking of U.S.
entertainment that could create misleading ideas about western civilization. This would
require the jamming of certain Internet stream websites and bootleg websites that
individuals in the target area might download. Furthermore, the only U.S. entertainment
that would be allowed through to the targeted area would be material that was approved
by the President, cabinet members, and the National Security Council.
In addition to the CNO campaign, there would need to be U.S. operatives in the
targeted area mitigating the flow of information. This would best be done through covert
action units in the targeted area as well as the surrounding countries where plagiarized
material may be smuggled. Operatives on the ground would seek to verify that U.S.
cinema was not reaching the Iraqi general public, and if discovering new channels for
bootleg material to flow through, report back along with means to cut off the information.
The purpose of this operation is not to solve the culture clash and radical
ideology, but to mitigate certain cultural trigger points that could create the “us vs. them”
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distinction. As well, the purpose of this is not to deny cultural merging as globalization
progresses, but allow time to fend off culture shock, and promote culture assimilation. In
many ways, the Internet sheds light on the different cultures that individuals did not have
access to before. This has created a cultural backlash and “nativism” globally, which
could lead to further radicalization.243 Mitigating that nativist mentality and curving
radical behavior could be done effectively through such an operation.
Further utilization of other certain covert action operations would be to the
detriment of the Islamic state. The benefit of covert action is that it is unknown who is
committing the acts. This works for the U.S. because it won’t be seen as the West
imposing on Islam. The use of Propaganda, Economic, and Paramilitary covert action
could present the U.S. with a tactical advantage, and because of the covert nature, there is
minimal time for the adversary to prepare for it. If done properly covert operations could
have a positive effect on those inside the Islamic State controlled territory. Covert
propaganda would further benefit such an operation. This would best be done by a false
flag operation, meaning that the individuals conducting the operation do not allow
anyone to know they are American. That way any messaging that is broadcast on a social
media site, or newspaper, or video message, is not seen as American propaganda, but
information from a potentially credible source. Sources are perceived credible if the
individuals consuming the message believe the messenger to be one of “us”. Establishing
oneself in a state which harbors protentional foreign fighters may not be difficult
considering the majority of foreign fighters migrate in from approximately 34 countries,
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which provides the U.S. with options.244 However, there are specific countries that would
be important to consider, such as Tunisia, where between 7,000-8,000 foreign fighters
have joined the Islamic State.245 Other Muslim populations to consider would be Russia,
Jordan, France, Turkey, Germany, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.246
The objective of covert propaganda is to upload massive quantities of messages
and propaganda to flood the Internet with information that directly contradicts or
undermines the Islamic State. More so, considering the religious nature of the Islamic
States messaging, the most significant propaganda would be demonstrating how the
Islamic State is un-Islamic and does not abide by sharia law. The mass quantity of
messages such as this would cause confusion and hesitation to those who may be
debating joining the Islamic State, or conducting violence on the Islamic State’s behalf.
Furthermore, cultural aspects of the Arab world, especially in Iraq should be taken
into account when designing propaganda. One such cultural aspect is the Islamic honor
system. Arabs, especially Iraqi Sunni-Arabs who are inhabiting the Islamic State
dominated territory, have high regard for honor, reputation, and status.247 Iraqi SunniArabs place much attention on how they are seen by others and make sure their
reputation is intact when making decisions. Understanding and spinning the international
conversation about the dishonor the Islamic State is bringing to the Ummah (Islamic
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community) and by directing focus on how the Islamic State leadership have no status or
power in the world could further hesitation among potential foreign fighters.
In addition, in Arab and Islamic culture, it is common for the husband and father
to be the patriarch of the family and community.248 This is crucial when considering the
high command of authority Baghdadi must impose on his organization. He must be seen
as having all the answers and the true decision maker of the caliphate. Individuals
imitating members of the Islamic State and spreading messages in mass quantities stating,
“Baghdadi is just a puppet of the Saudi regime,” which the Islamic State has deemed an
apostate, or “Baghdadi doesn’t make the decisions” could undermine Baghdadi and the
Islamic State’s credibility.
Simultaneously, as the U.S. broadcasts propaganda through international media
outlets to create confusion and hesitation amongst the Islamic State, further special
operations must be considered in the attempt to create disorder and chaos in the Islamic
State. An operation such as this would be best done with special operations forces
continuing to perform capture-kill missions along with disrupting opportunities for the
Islamic State to gain further financial help outside its occupied territory. The disruption
of the Islamic State’s outside finances will become more of a salient issue for the
organization as it loses territory and the ability to tax those in its area of operation, which
has been seen in 2016 when the Islamic State began to lose territory.249 However, as the
Islamic State loses territory, Baghdadi may seek alternative means of financing the
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organization, which would be necessary for the Islamic State to survive, or to continue its
war in the region. Therefore, cutting finances as well as hunting down figurehead
leadership is a requirement for an information operation against the Islamic State.

The Role Of Strategic Communications
Defusing potential foreign fighters also requires a fully coordinated strategic
communications strategy. This communications strategy must target core issues among
veteran and potential foreign fighters to prevent further radicalization or support of the
Islamic State. This is best accomplished by using targeted dialogue aimed at the Islamic
State’s ideology and methods. As stated before, the Islamic State views itself as the
legitimate caliphate in which all Muslims must support and defend. This means that
delegitimizing the Islamic State is key to resolving this conflict. However, currently the
U.S. is using key phrases and terminology that supports the Islamic State’s rhetoric, and
therefore must be changed to create the desired effect.
The first is to abandon identifying Badri by his desired name, Abu Bakr alBaghdadi. Abu Bakr was the father-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad, and was the first
Caliph after the death of Mohammad, according to Sunni Islam.250 As Gorka argues,
Badri chose this name to send a message to the Sunni Muslims that he is the rightful
Caliph of the new caliphate, that the Islamic State is a legitimate caliphate, and it is the
Sunni Muslims responsibility to join. The U.S. using the name Baghdadi to describe
Badri does not diffuse radicalization, nor does it delegitimize the Islamic State, but
creates more conflict.
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In a similar context, if members of the Christian faith heard a man call himself
Saint Peter, and assert himself as the leader to restore the Christian faith to its pure form
and heard everyone identifying him as Saint Peter, there would be an innate attachment to
that individual from the Christian community. The connection would be formed, even if
one was not in support of his cause. As well, those who consider themselves devoted
Christians would have a stronger emotional attachment to the conflict, leading to
aggression and radicalization. Therefore, identifying Badri as Baghdadi creates further
conflict.
Moreover, from a strategic communications perspective the U.S. government,
along with the U.S. media must cease associating Badri with the Caliph. The association
would be halted by the U.S. no longer calling Badri “Baghdadi”, which would
disseminate to the U.S. public. Altering the dialogue would aid in the U.S. message in the
mainstream and global media that the U.S. is not at war with the Islamic community. This
would not generate short-term benefits, but in time would aid in the U.S. message of the
Islamic State being the enemy of Islam, and would change the perspective in the longterm.
In addition, another term creating a rift between cultures is the word “jihadist.”
The term jihadist does not accurately describe U.S. adversaries but further establishes the
U.S. is at war against Islam, that the Islamic State is the caliphate, and that committing
terrorist attacks is in support of Islam. The reason the word jihadist aids the Islamic
State’s information operations campaign and hinders the U.S. is because the word jihad,
from which the word “jihadist” is derived, means, “... the true meaning of jihad - which
refers to the noble human ‘struggle’ or ‘endeavor’ to realize God’s will for a just and
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merciful society on earth - from those who would willfully abuse it”, according to
Michael Waller.251 Jihadist could be interpreted as simply as being a wholesome Muslim
and supporting the cause of trying to keep a moral Muslim society. This creates distortion
as to the U.S. objective when the U.S. claims to be fighting jihadists. It could also lead to
the misunderstanding that the U.S. is at war against individuals trying to be virtuous by
their religion, or at war against Islam entirely. The miscommunication may further
resentment and aid in the Islamic State’s IO campaign, which frequently states that the
U.S. and the West are at war with Islam, and that all jihadists must come to help fight.
This furthers the “us vs them” ideology and the cultural divide. However, if the U.S. does
not address the Islamic State or its supporters as jihadists, then what word best fits to
rebrand the organization?
Using Quranic terminology to encompass the Islamic State, foreign fighters, and
terrorist activity, promote hesitation to those who may be persuaded by their propaganda.
Waller defines the word “Hirabah” as “an act of terrorism, a subversive act inflicted by
an individual or a gang or individuals, breaking the established norms of peace, civic
laws, treaties, agreements, moral and ethical codes…”252 The word hirabah fully depicts
the adversary of the U.S., and hirabah describes this adversary in a way that cannot be
distorted. The hirabah are the violent extremists against Islam, which the U.S. is
combating.
Labeling the Islamic State and the foreign fighters for what they are is a subtle
tactic, however, it is essential nonetheless. As Waller argues, “if they heard ‘hirabah’
instead of ‘jihad,’ if they heard ‘murder’ instead of ‘martyr,’ if they heard they were
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bound for hell not heaven, they might not be so quick to sign up to kill themselves and a
handful of so-called ‘infidels’ along the way.”253 Murderer does not sound as romantic or
as sacrificial as martyr. These simple changes in how we approach the foreign fighter
dilemma and radicalization could substantially affect funding, and recruiting for the
Islamic State.
The final task of strategic communications in assisting this psychological strategy
is for the U.S. government and U.S. media to demonstrate how the Islamic State is not
fighting the West but is, in fact, killing fellow Muslims. While the Islamic State does
broadcast this message themselves by stating that the Muslims it killed are not real
Muslims, there is no counter-narrative to this message. The U.S. strategy could benefit by
countering this narrative in demonstrating how the victims of the Islamic State are the
real jihadists trying to live their lives in peace and not chaos. This narrative, along with
the other two dialogue changes previously addressed will shift the ideological
environment against the Islamic State, and create indecision in foreign fighters whom
debate joining and fighting for the Islamic State.

Conclusion
“The wound of words is worse than the wound of swords” ~ Arabian proverb254

Information operations are not the solution to the problem, but the beginning
towards discovering that solution. As this thesis aims to demonstrate that the lack of a
U.S. policy using information operations and strategic communications as its center point
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for any strategy against the Islamic State and the foreign fighters currently supporting
them has enabled further violence. The Islamic State may lose the battle of Mosul. The
Islamic State may be defeated militarily in the near future, or retreat largely underground
as Al Qaeda did. Yet, the defeat of the Islamic State does not resolve the foreign fighter
problem, but simply passes the problem to the next generation of American’s to see a
new terrorist organization emerge. The current U.S. strategy is no solution, but a stalling
tactic until a solution can be made. Until that solution is realized, groups such as the
Islamic State and foreign fighters are becoming deadlier, more knowledgeable and
interconnected to resources that enable them to inflict damage abroad.
This was seen recently as troops fighting in Mosul discovered chemical weapons
and ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical weapons.255 A recent discovery in
the battle of Mosul confirmed the Islamic State has both chemical weapons such as
mustard gas, as well as Russian-made surface to air missiles capable of reaching 60,000
feet.256 Technologies such as the SA-3 launchers are perceived to be sophisticated
technology only available to state actors. The escalation of technology proliferation by
non-state actors such as the Islamic State may continue as core elements involving the
radicalization of individuals is neglected.
Furthermore, a U.S. psychological strategy would provide assistance for the U.S.
in reestablishing credibility in the international arena. The global war on terror along with
events such as the “red line” over Syria’s use of chemical weapons in its civil war not
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being backed has resulted in the United States’ credibility being questioned.257 Lack of
credibility could result in allies questioning U.S. commitments as well as hinder future
allies from being made. The overall consequence of U.S. credibility suffering is the U.S.
having less a diplomatic role in international relations.
However, reestablishing U.S. credibility and undermining U.S. adversaries’
credibility can be accomplished with the use of information operations and strategic
communications through a psychological strategy. The U.S. prioritization of cultural and
psychological dynamics in the war on terror allows the U.S. to understand an enemy and
successfully defeat that enemy. As former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army general
Gordon Sullivan once said, “information is the currency of victory on the battlefield.”258
The understanding of information in a conflict will result in victory or defeat for the U.S.
Therefore, future success in the war of ideas will depend on the value the United State
places on information. Yet, the longer the U.S. continues to fail to acknowledge the
psychological dilemma in the conflict against the Islamic State and the foreign fighters,
the more likely the U.S. will repeat the conflict with another terrorist group in the future.
Therefore, the contemporary U.S. policy will determine the length of the wars against
radicalization. As this war is already generational, the necessity for the U.S. to emphasize
a psychological strategy will continue to escalate as the war continues.
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